Lathoron

ROMER: Today I had an imaginery dialogue with the great sociologist Lathoron.
SPIEGLER: What about?
ROMER: It was about science.

ROMER: Lathoron! We meet at last!
LATHORON: Indeed we do Romer.
ROMER: If you don't mind I would like to ask you a few questions about science. I have heard great things about your knowledge on this subject. It is said, for example, that you know science better than the scientists themselves do!
LATHORON: It is the case that science for scientists is not the same as science for ordinary people. My concern is to look at what scientists do and what it is we call science.
ROMER: A most interesting and necessary task my friend! Many persons I have talked to refer to science in conversation but it is never clear what they mean by this.
LATHORON: I know.
ROMER: What is science Lathoron?
LATHORON: Science is a culturally produced symbolic of objective truth, whose method is required to meet certain criteria of validity if it is to be accepted as scientific.
ROMER: A learned definition if ever I heard one Lathoron! I'm not sure, however, that this is what people have in mind when they use the word "science." I think they mean "objective truth" but have dropped, out of ignorance or forgetfulness, the other elements of your definition.
LATHORON: I wouldn't be surprised if they had. It is in the nature of a symbolic to be confused with what it symbolises.

ROMER: What about "science" Lathoron? Is "science" culturally determined?
LATHORON: Yes. As I just told you.
ROMER: I beg your pardon. I mean is the word "science" culturally determined?
LATHORON: What?
ROMER: Let me ask you this: is language a cultural symbolic?
LATHORON: I believe it is. Language is the most cultural of phenomena. And of course it is symbolic.
ROMER: Do you agree that the symbolic of language consists of words?
LATHORON: Yes. The English language consists of words. Other languages consist of signs or even gestures. Body language for instance.
ROMER: I dare say you are right Lathoron! We agree however that our language, which is English, consists of words. Right?
LATHORON: Absolutely Romer. But what is your point?
ROMER: I will tell you in a moment. First you must agree to answer my questions. Can you do this for me?
LATHORON: I must confess that I am not used to being cross-examined like this Romer. But go on.
ROMER: Thank you Lathoron. We agree then that language is a cultural symbolic and that our language, English, consists of words. Is that correct?
LATHORON (sighing): Yes that's correct.
ROMER: From these propositions we can infer that words are cultural symbols, since language as cultural symbolic was said to consist of words. Am I right?
LATHORON: Yes. But get to the point quickly please. I am busy.
ROMER: No doubt you are, Lathoron. A man of your know-how must be in high demand. But you needn't wait much longer. I think we have arrived at a satisfactory answer.
LATHORON (scornfully): Which is it?
ROMER: That if your statement according to which "science is a culturally produced symbolic" is part of our language then it must be part of a cultural symbolic consisting of words. This gives rise to the question: how can we be sure that science is a cultural symbolic if the words "science", "cultural" and "symbolic" are cultural symbols?
LATHORON: I will reflect on it some other time. I have to go now.
ROMER: Please bear it mind. Farewell.

ROMER: That was how we left it, Spiegler.
SPIEGLER: What about the rest of Lathoron's definition—"objective truth" I think it was?
ROMER: You are quite right. We did not touch on that crucial statement. How would you characterize objective truth?
SPIEGLER: I would characterize it as truth pertaining to the object.
ROMER: And is there truth that does not pertain to the object?
SPIEGLER: I would suppose so. But how could we know?
ROMER: My feeling is that were objective truth truth there would be no sense in qualifying it as objective.
SPIEGLER: Indeed! What is objective is often taken to be the truth.
ROMER: If that were true then talk about objective truth would be empty jargon. Let us revert to your definition; objective truth is truth that pertains to the object. What does this tell us?
SPIEGLER: That truth needn't pertain to the object; that they are seperate things. Truth needn't pertain to anything at all.
ROMER: But surely truth is not seperate from us Spiegler? I mean, it took the tongue and our ability to form sounds with it to establish the idea?
SPIEGLER: What are you saying?
ROMER: That talk about objective truth implies a subjective truth. Only subjective truth pertains to the subject.
SPIEGLER: To ourselves you mean!
ROMER: Precisely. An ancient colleague formulated it thus: "know thyself."

SPIEGLER: Who am I? This sounds like a recipe for madness Romer.
ROMER: Yes. Madness is how convention would qualify this pursuit Spiegler. But that [old lie] should not deter you from seeking the truth.
SPIEGLER: What truth?
ROMER: That knowledge of the self should not be dissociated from knowledge of the object. If you do not know yourself you will mistake your objective knowledge to be objective. In other words you will mistake your knowledge of the object to be the object itself. Lack of this self-knowledge explains the modern confusion between objectivity and truth.
SPIEGLER: How am I to gain self-knowledge?
ROMER: By appealing to your conscience.
SPIEGLER: My conscience?
ROMER: The knowledge of your knowledge.

SPIEGLER: Why is it that what is objective is so often taken to be the truth?
ROMER: This is a tricky question to answer. What is objective is what characterizes the object. An object is objective in its relationship to the beholder of the object whom we call the subject.
SPIEGLER: Yes.
ROMER: I suppose it is believed that subjects interfere with the objectivity of objects coming as they do from different horizons and backgrounds, affected as they are by their subjectivity; be it their emotions, prejudices, sillinesses and so on. Because an object is seen differently by each beholder some agreement is required as to what characterizes the object in such a way that each beholder can agree to those common characteristics in his dealings with the object. And, to answer your question, what characterizes or is believed to characterize the object in this way, i.e. in a way which all can agree to, this "what" we call science. Science therefore has a claim to universal validity, since all those who adhere to these "common characteristics" otherwise known as conventions must deem these characterizations to be valid.
SPIEGLER: And, in your view, what is held to be universally valid, valid for all, is confused with the truth?
ROMER: That is what happens. Thus, for example, "2+2=4" or "in 1939 Germany invaded Poland" or "distance by time is velocity," universally valid as they are by force of convention, are all held to be valid, hence true. Truth then becomes understood to mean validity, or, at best, correctness.
SPIEGLER: All the more so, I would surmise, that technology, such as that which makes viewing of this page possible, is in part an application of scientific findings?
ROMER: Yes. Technology is a physical, i.e. objective, validation of scientific conventions in the twofold sense that objects such as the computer equiped with internet access validate whatever characterizations made their fabrication possible; and that technology enables scientists to verify the reliability or exactitude of theoretical formulas or hypotheses.

SPIEGLER: Do you have a better understanding of what is meant by truth?
ROMER: I suggest we investigate the meaning of the word this minute.
SPIEGLER: But isn't that simply an impossible task?
ROMER: Why so?
SPIEGLER: It seems to me that we cannot investigate the meaning of the word truth without knowing what truth is, for in the absence of that knowledge we could not know whether the meaning our investigation produced was true or false.
ROMER: This is true. But by decreeing that such an investigation is impossible we would be agreeing to something about the word truth that made its investigation impossible. That something could only be suggested to us by its meaning.
SPIEGLER: That merely tells us that truth has a meaning but not what the meaning is.
ROMER: You will find the same problem for all investigations into the meanings of words. Without knowledge of truth we could never know whether the meanings our investigations produced were true or false.
SPIEGLER: Precisely. The need to know truth seems all the more necessary as it is impossible.
ROMER: But are we not speaking like blind men?
SPIEGLER: How so?
ROMER: Truth must be That which makes meaning possible!
SPIEGLER: What do you mean?
ROMER: In the same way that denying the possibility of meaning suggests a meaning that is not possible, truth must be both that which makes meaning possible and is suggested by the possible meaning of a word.
SPIEGLER: I see. And so on its own terms the meaning of this definition of truth suggests truth and is made possible by it?
ROMER: Yes.
SPIEGLER: That is all very well but how are we to determine whether a meaning is true or false?
ROMER: A meaning, my friend, is neither true nor untrue. It merely suggests the truth by virtue of which it is made possible. Where there is no meaning there is no truth. And where there is no truth there is no meaning.
SPIEGLER: I see. So when you complain about the meaninglessness of law you're in fact bemoaning its untruth?
ROMER: Yes. Where there is no meaning there is no truth. But there is no desire for meaning either—hence no desire for truth.
SPIEGLER: That's a rather damming verdict for a venerable Roman institution I must say! But you must be right!
ROMER: A Roman institution that has degenerated through priestly influence—Hebrews, Christians, Moslems are all but the same. To recover our law from this petty meddling—this is our task! 30/3/0/2