enowning/éreignis

Roman Funerary Monuments

2009-09-20T14:46:00.001-07:00

Look at Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, ‘funerary altar of Gaius Munatius Faustus’ (Block 4, pp.36-7), and read the following description:

This tomb is found, fronting the road, at the Herculaneum Gate cemetery at Pompeii. It dates to the mid first century AD and is in the form of an altar decorated with sculptural reliefs. On one side these depict a bisellium (a double seat) and footstool. This ‘double seat’ may have been utilised at the theatre, amphitheatre and other public events. A ship in full sail, manned by several figures, is depicted on the west side of the altar. On the front is a detailed scene, showing a ceremony of some kind, perhaps a distribution of grain or money by the deceased to the people of Pompeii. The epitaph reads ‘Naevolia Tyche, freedwoman of Lucius, for herself and for Gaius Munatius Faustus, an Augustalis, from the Country District, to whom the town councillors, with the consent of the people, decreed an honorific seat (bisellium) for his merits. Naevolia Tyche had this monument made in her lifetime for her own freedmen and freedwomen and those of Gaius Munatius Faustus’. A small bust of Naevolia Tyche is located in the floral frame that surrounds the inscription.

Consider these sources, and in no more than 500 words:
(i) Briefly provide the context;
(ii) Discuss any points of significance in respect of the following
a. Content
b. Form
c. The value as a source for understanding certain aspects of the Classical world

As Block 3 Part 1 notes, an important source for understanding ancient Rome from a non-elite perspective consists in funerary and sepulchral inscriptions. The tomb under consideration dates from the first century CE at which time most dead bodies were still cremated. The remains were placed in a container buried in the ground or housed in a tomb as here. To stand a chance of being noticed, tombs tended to face the roads, as a result of which cemeteries had an elongated shape. It was during this period that funerary monuments came into fashion for many freed slaves, even bringing the practice into disrepute for the better off; having too lavish a tomb could be seen as a sign of lesser social status. But for the many freedmen and women of Rome, such monuments provided an opportunity to make good their status as freed persons, having faced many social difficulties as a result.

Gaius Munatius Faustus was a freedman of relatively high social status, being an augustalis, a priest of the imperial cult. His tria nomina contains the praenomen and nomen of his ex-master, Gaius Munatius. As was the custom, the commemorator’s name also features on the epitaph (Naevolia Tyche); she was likely to be of freed status also. Like most epitaphs, the one under consideration, although relatively long, is condensed so as to focus on the name of the deceased and commemorator, the positions and honours received by the deceased, and some information concerning the beneficiaries of the tomb (in this case, their combined freed slaves). To prepare for the future in this way was done to secure the tomb’s maintenance and its longevity. We might also speculate and say that it does the deceased and the commemorator a special favour to be seen as having freed slaves of their own, a real sign of their progression on the social ladder. The epitaph is completed by pictorial representations on the tomb itself; on the east side we have a double seat, probably awarded as a privilege, and used at the theatre or amphitheatre. On the west side is a ship in full sail with its crew and could either be an indicator of the deceased’s occupation or simply of the passage into the afterlife. On the front, and hence most visible to the passer-by, is the deceased distributing corn or money to a crowd of people – an element of his occupation perhaps and his civic status, something he must have been proud of as it shows him in a position of power (giving the dole).

As is argued in the DVD, funerary monuments such as this one were a way to construct an identity for yourself and your descendants, presenting to the world those facets of your existence most worthy of remembrance. They can tell us a great deal about ancient Roman society from an angle which is not as elitist as ancient literature, which was the exclusive product of the well-to-do.

472 words

Bibliography
Ancient sources
Funerary altar of Gaius Munatius Faustus from the Herculaneum Gate cemetery, Pompeii, first century CE.

Modern scholarship
DVD 4, Section 1: Roman funerary monuments
Hope, V. And Huskinson, J. (2006) A219 Block 4: Rome – City and People, Milton Keynes: The Open University

Roman Baths

2009-09-20T14:44:00.000-07:00

Answer the following question in no more than 2,000 words:
‘Bathing occupied a central position in the social life of the day’ (OCCC, p.115). To what extent does the available evidence support this claim about the Roman baths?

To determine whether or not the above statement is supported by primary evidence we must analyse and assess the latter. First, we will look at the archaeological evidence which alone provides solid proof that baths of some description existed in Ancient Rome and that they were not a rarity. We will then turn our attention to the literary evidence which is the main port of call for assessing the social significance of bathing during the Imperial period as well as the late Republic. Finally, in the light of modern scholarship, we will conclude on the extent to which the available evidence corroborates the OCCC statement in its entry on ‘baths’.

According to DVD 4, Section 3, track 1, baths in Ancient Rome were the largest consumers of water, itself a near-sacred commodity. Impressive remains exist of the vast aqueducts the Romans built for the transportation of water. This already gives us an idea of the scale of some of the baths in question, including the baths of Caracalla built near Rome in CE 211-6 by the emperor of that name. They occupied 12,000 m2 and as the DVD points out, were ‘designed to impress.’ Plate 48 of the Illustrations Book gives us a plan of the baths and reveals their architectural symmetry and the fact that thermae such as this one were large complexes featuring a vast amount of rooms and hallways, each with their own function; among them were the changing rooms, the warm and hot, cold and tepid rooms, all with their own basins and pools, and the palaestrae or exercise-areas. In addition, the general plan (Illustrations Book, Plate 47) indicates that the baths in question boasted extra facilities such as gardens, exercise-grounds and a library. There is also physical evidence that the thermae were intricately decorated (Illustrations Book, Plate 50-51) with statues and mosaics. This information supports the view that baths were socially prominent; for what else could justify such an expenditure of resources, financial and physical? In fact the evidence goes further: a lot of time must have been spent in these thermae given the graded nature of the baths going from hot to cold, not to mention the exercise areas, gardens and library. Clearly, bathing in these baths was far removed from the quick morning swim in the local swimming pool! That Roman baths were not a rarity can be deduced from catalogues of publicly accessible establishments which amount to about one thousand (G.G.Fagan, 1999, p.25 in Reading 4.26).

According to Garrett G. Fagan (2005, p.12 in Reading 4.28) there are few ancient descriptions of what a visit to the baths was like. One such a description, albeit only as a context for further moral teachings, is Seneca’s (c.4 BCE-CE 41) letter 56 (Reading 4.5) which features a survey of the baths from the viewpoint of the sound emanating from them. Indeed this letter gives us slightly more tangible and substantial evidence (compared to other literary sources) of what actually went on in the baths; for example he hears the grunts of those exercising, the smack of a hand massaging, the ball player shouting out the score, a brawl, the noise of someone caught thieving, somebody singing in the bath, the splashes of those leaping into the pool, the penetrating cries of those whose hairs are being removed and the various exclamations of the nearby merchants and sellers. From this narrative it is obvious that public baths were not only noisy but busy places bustling with people from all walks of life, including thieves and sellers, and that they were not strictly limited to bathing per se. In letter 86 (Reading 4.5) Seneca bemoans the move towards greater luxury in bathing and implies that baths can be in and out of fashion depending on the ‘novelties’ they provide. Fashions only concern mass phenomena so we can imagine that baths were such a phenomenon. Yet further evidence needs to be adduced to complete the picture: what was the nature of the social interactions that Seneca merely glosses over? Martial (CE 38-c.101 CE) in his epigrams illustrates the fact that the baths were the setting for many a social relationship, including between patron and client (3.36), between rivals (3.44) and between potential lovers or men and women (3.51). Epigram 1.59 also shows that dining and bathing were linked activities (Reading 4.2). Indeed in Petronius’ (-CE 66) Satyricon (26-28) the ‘beginning of dinner’ occurs at the baths in the midst of much social ostentation on the part of the host Trimalchio (Reading 4.3). These authors largely support the view that bathing was a central social activity.

Other evidence is less explicit in this regard. Ovid (43 BCE-CE17) and Horace (65 BCE-8 BCE) both refer to the baths in their poems (Art of Love, Book 3 and Satire 1.6 in Readings 4.12 and 4.16). It is no exaggeration to say that popular poets such as these speak for many in their verse. Thus, for Ovid, ‘public baths provide plenty of private fun for girls’ and for Horace the right time to have a bath is ‘when the sun grows fiercer’. Authors also have their preferences; both Martial and Statius (CE 45) (Epigram 6.42 in Reading 4.3 and Silvae 1.5 in Reading 4.17) praise the baths of Claudius Etruscus in their own different ways with Statius, in particular, drawing on mythological references and humour to make his point. Lucian (120 CE) and Vitruvius are more detached sources, focusing more on architecture and layout. What is striking about their viewpoint is how elaborate the design of the baths actually was and, to repeat a point made earlier on, such effort in construction would not be commendable if it were not for an important end, namely the building of a public bath. Pliny the Elder (c.CE 23-79) (Natural History 36.121) demonstrates the ubiquity of baths by noting that the number of public baths in Rome has ‘grown infinitely’ since the 170 known to have existed during the time of Agrippa in the second half of the first century BCE. Another pointer to the centrality of bathing in the social life of Rome is to be found in Celsus’ On Medicine 1.4 (Reading 4.23) which describes the procedure to be taken when entering the baths. Indeed, the medical aspects of bathing must have been a concern for many Romans. As observed by Inge Nielsen (1990 pp.144-8 in Reading 4.25), statues of Hygieia and Asclepius featured in some baths, bearing witness to the importance of hygiene, even at that time.

If baths occupied a central occupation in society what is the evidence pertaining to the bathing habits of the elite? The emperor Marcus Aurelius (CE 121-180) himself, in his Meditations (8.24) created an analogy between baths and ‘life in all its parts’ both bringing as they do ‘sweat, dirt, greasy water and everything that is disgusting.’ Suetonius (b. c. CE 70) in his Lives of the Caesars (Readings 4.15 and 4.19) shows how some emperors like Titus and Hadrian occasionally bathed in public. As was probably the case in the Circus or the amphitheatre, the common folk would have appreciated the proximity of the emperor to their world and the emperors in turn could reap the benefits (ECW, Essay Nine). If the emperor chose the baths to appear in public that must be a sign, if not proof, that they were socially key. On his tomb epitaph, the emperor Antoninus Pius (Corpus Inscriptiorum Latinarum XIV 98 in Reading 4.8) privileged the completion of public baths using quality material (marble) over his conquest of Parthia. As Natasha Zajac (1999, pp.100-105) argues, the dedication of public baths by the emperors could be seen as an expression of social supremacy, bringing them kudos and lasting power, the baths being highly frequented and used. Further evidence of this is to be found in Pliny’s (c. CE 61-c. 112) letters 10.23 and 10.39; in the first letter Pliny makes a plea to the emperor to support the rebuilding of a public bath in Prusa, a move Piny states worthy of Trajan’s (CE 53-117) reign. The permission and funds having been granted, Pliny asks the emperor in the second letter about the site to be used. Again he reaffirms the notion that ‘the splendid public monument will be worthy of [Trajan’s] name.’ That emperors of all people should be directly implicated in the building of public baths shows that their social significance was high¬ – indeed, no one could be seen to compete with the princeps on public matters of this importance. Pliny himself, owner as he was of many private baths and swimming pools (letters 2.17 and 5.6), ordered the construction of public baths in his will, a deed recorded on his epitaph (CIL V 5262 in Reading 4.8).

What about the lower social orders? It is common knowledge that even the very poorest had access to the public baths (Carcopino, 1941, p.254). As for slaves, there is some evidence that they were accepted free of charge in some specified baths but ordinarily visited the baths in their dependent capacity, i.e. as attendants (Fagan, 1999 pp.25-34 in Reading 4.26). This is borne out by, among others, Pliny’s letter 3.14 where a slave attendant causes a citizen to hit his master. Some inscriptions record popular perceptions of the baths. The most famous is that of Tiberius Claudius Secundus (CIL VI 15258 in Reading 4.8) who places baths on the same level as wine and sex (‘the essence of life’). Socially, it would seem, the baths constituted a microcosm of Rome itself (Zajac, 1999 in Reading 4.27).

In conclusion, the evidence tends to support the claim that ‘bathing occupied a central position in the social life of the day.’ However, hard evidence of what actually went on in the baths is hard to come by, as Garrett G. Fagan has pointed out (1999 in Reading 4.26). Rarely does a source consider bathing for its own sake; rather, it is alluded to in passing, as though it were something that most Romans took for granted. Perhaps this is due to the activity’s centrality; it was so common a practice that few had much to say about it, like eating or drinking wine. That said, one has to bear in mind that the evidence is not typical (Fagan, 1999); it is geographically and chronologically specific. Baths undoubtedly evolved during Rome’s long history and, with them, bathing habits. Thus, although we can accept the OCCC statement at first, the word ‘bathing’ encompasses many a social a reality, especially between rich and poor, and hence each source must be treated with care. In fact, we may contrast Tiberius Claudius Secundus’ epitaph (see above) with a letter by Pliny (letter 2.8) that replaces the word ‘sex’ with ‘cool springs.’ Bathing and the perception of it varied according to your background.

1,804 words

Bibliography
Ancient sources
Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, in Campbell, R. (ed and trans.) (1969), Harmondsworth: Penguin
Martial, Epigrams, in Shackleton Bailey, D.R. (ed and trans.) (1993) Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, vol.I
Petronius, The Satyricon, in Sullivan, J. (ed and trans.) (1965) The Satyricon and The Fragments, Harmondsworth: Penguin
Ovid, The Art of Love: Book 3 in Green, P. (ed and trans.) (1982) Ovid: The Erotic Poems, Harmondsworth: Penguin
Horace, Satire 1.6 in Rudd, N. (trans.) (1979) Horace: Satires and Epistles, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.70
Statius, Silvae 1.5 in Shackleton Bailey, D.R. (ed and trans.) (2003) Statius: Silvae, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press
Lucian, Hippias or the Bath 5-8 in Harmon, A.M. (trans.) (1979) Lucian, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Vitruvius, On Baths 5.10 in Granger, F. (ed and trans.) (1962) Vitruvius: On Architecture, London: William Heinemann
Pliny the Elder, Natural History 36.121-23 in Eichholz, D.E. (trans.) (1971) Pliny: Natural History, London: William Heinemann
Celsus, On Medicine 1.4 in Spencer, W.G. (trans.) (1971) Celsus: De Medicina, London: William Heinemann
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations in Staniforth, M. (trans.) (1964) Harmondsworth: Penguin
Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars in Graves, R. (trans.) (1989) Harmondsworth: Penguin
Suetonius, Lives of the later Caesars in Birley, A. (trans.) Harmondsworth: Penguin
Radice, B. (trans.) (1963) The Letters of the Younger Pliny London: Penguin
Corpus Inscriptiorum Latinarum

Modern Scholarship
Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds) (1998) The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
DVD 4, Section 3, Track 1: The Baths of Caracalla
A219 Illustrations Book, Plates 47 and 48
Garrett G. Fagan (1999) ‘Interpreting the evidence: did slaves bathe at the baths?’ in DeLaine, J. And Johnston, D.E. (eds) Roman Baths and Bathing, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Roman Baths held at Bath, England, 30 March-4April 1992. Part : Bathing and Society, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, pp.25-34
Garrett G. Fagan (2005) ‘A visit to the baths with Martial’ in Fagan, G.G., Bathing in Public in the Roman World, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp.12-39
Nielsen, I. (1990) Thermae et Balnea: The Architecture and Cultural History of Roman Public Baths, vol.I text, Aarhus University Press, pp.144-48
Hope, V. (2006) ‘The voice of a Roman audience’ in Perkins, P. (ed.), Experiencing the Classical World, Milton Keynes: The Open University, pp.193-212
Zajac, N. (1999) ‘The thermae: a policy of public health or personal legitimation?’ in DeLaine, J. And Johnston, D.E. (eds) Roman Baths and Bathing, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Roman Baths held at Bath, England, 30 March-4April 1992. Part : Bathing and Society, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, pp.100-105
Carponico, J. (1941) Daily Life in Ancient Rome, Toronto, Mitcham and Sea Point: Penguin

Marius

2009-07-24T03:30:00.002-07:00

Part 1 (source analysis question)
Read Sallust, The Jugurthine War, 85, ‘To live in luxury ... receive from another’ (Reading 3.20 in Readings Book 2). In no more than 500 words:
(i) Briefly provide its context;
(ii) Discuss any points of significance in respect of the following
a. Content
b. Form
c. The value as a source for understanding certain aspects of the Classical world

Sallust, the author of the text under consideration, was a Roman historian who was born in 86 BCE, the year of Marius’ seventh and final consulship. The extract is taken from his monograph of the war against Jugurtha, The Jugurthine War. This war caused an outcry of indignation in Rome by the way it was dealt with by Roman aristocrats and generals who succumbed to Jugurtha’s manipulative tactics of bribing the enemy into peace favourable to his interests. A commission was set up by the tribune Mamilius to investigate the matter and “aristocratic corruption generally” (Block 3, p.107). This provided Marius, an ambitious military man, with an opportunity to stir up the people and win popular support for his first consulship in 107 BCE. The extract seeks to capture this turn of events.

Sallust punctuates his monograph with a speech given by Marius to the people of Rome in which he decries the corruption of the ruling class and blames them for the failure to check Jugurtha’s illegitimate rule over Numidia. In particular he accuses the noblemen of double standards, of “subjecting [their] army to rigorous discipline” whilst living in luxury. Marius, on the other hand, took part in the nitty-gritty of military duties in Africa when serving under Metellus, his patron. In doing so, he won the affection of his fellow soldiers and convinced them to elect him for the next consulship (Reading 3.19). Whence his statement that “it was by conduct such as I recommend that your ancestors won renown for themselves and for the state.” Marius compares himself to the Romans of the ‘golden age’, in particular those who fought in the first two Punic Wars, thus winning the hearts of the common people. He contrasts his conduct with that of the noblemen, whose only achievement is to share in the past glory of their ancestors whilst failing to live up to their standards. Indeed they are, according to Marius, luxury-loving and idle yet expect to hold “all posts of honour” at the hands of the people. Although the theme of degeneration is evident, the speech is inflammatory because it reawakens the spectre of the Gracchi brothers whose popular legislation met with the opposition of the nobles. The tone used is threatening. Thus, he says, “these proud men make a very big mistake.” For, although they may have inherited “riches, portrait busts, and [...] glorious memory” they cannot lay claim to having inherited the “virtue” of their illustrious forebears, for, by its nature, virtue cannot be bequeathed. This is a very radical statement as it undermines head on the principle of heredity and the justification for aristocracy (which, etymologically, means rule by the ‘best’). Like the Gracchi brothers and Caesar after him, Marius is a demagogue, a man of the people, at least in appearance.

This anti-aristocratic speech, although clearly coloured by Sallust for the purposes of his monograph, gives us an insight into the very deep tensions of the late Republic, between the plebeians and the patricians. Indeed, this tension was so great that it created a rift among the ruling cast itself, as increasingly, ambitious politicians appealed to the people over and above the heads of the Senate and long-established families.

536 words

Bibliography
Ancient sources
Sallust, The Jugurthine War 85 in Handford, S.A. (trans.) (1963), Sallust, The Jugurthine War/The Conspiracy of Catiline, London: Penguin, pp.120-122
Plutarch, Life of Marius 7-8 in Warner, R. (trans.) (1972), Fall of the Roman Republic, Six Lives by Plutarch, London: Penguin, pp.18,20).

Modern Scholarship
Andrews, C., Fear, T. and Perkins, P. (2006) A219 Block 3: The Roman Republic, Milton Keynes: The Open University

The Past in the Roman Republic

2009-07-23T11:19:00.000-07:00

Part 2 (essay question)
Answer the following question in no more than 1,500 words:
‘What the Romans wrote about their past was strongly influenced by their present.’ Discuss this statement with reference to Roman society, culture and politics, using examples that you have studied.

A favourite quotation of Cicero’s was by the poet Ennius (239-169 BCE) who had written a narrative poem on the history of the Roman people, the Annales: “Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque.”1 For Cicero and his contemporaries it epitomized the debt they owed to their forebears and the admiration they held for the ‘golden age’ of Rome (Cowell, 1956). This notion of a ‘golden age’ of Rome was relatively common among the elite (Block 3, p.40) and found expression, as we shall see, in the works of various writers (such as Sallust, Livy and Horace) . Yet this glorification of the past had as its context the (out)growth of the Roman empire and the eventual demise of the Republican system. In other words, the more chaotic and torn Rome became, the more the past seemed to offer a measure of redemption, a tendency which culminated in the literature of the Principate of Augustus. With the exception of Virgil (70-19 BCE), who was a case apart as he was concerned with writing the founding myth of Rome in the Aeneid, the historians, poets and active politicians considered below undoubtedly adapted their vision of the past according to the requirements of their different agendas.

Another way in which the Romans linked to their past was through genealogy and the cult of their ancestors. A surviving example of this cult is to be found in the epitaphs dedicated, among others, to the Scipio family on their stone sarcophagi. Inscriptions celebrating the link between the past and the present also appeared on public monuments; thus the inscriptions of Augustus’ Res Gestae adorned bronze pillars outside his home in Rome and other monuments throughout the empire (Block 3, p.134). Let us therefore consider these sources and their respective contexts.

The problems of the present and the decline from past values are captured by the historian Sallust (86-35 BCE) (Reading 3.7). He notes that “by hard work and just dealing the power of the state increased” until Rome’s greatest rival, Carthage, was defeated in 146 BCE. “It was then that fortune turned unkind and confounded all her enterprises.” The spoils of war that naturally followed from victory, he says, “proved a burden and a curse.” They engendered in the Roman spirit the twin evils of avarice and ambition, “[destroying] honour and integrity” in their wake, and leading to religion being neglected. He characterizes the ascent of Sulla in scathing terms leading as it did to “universal robbery and pillage” and even his troops succumbed to oriental luxury, wine and women. Gone were the days of “our godfearing ancestors” who had been replaced by “bare successors” who knew no kind of rule other than that of oppression. Here, the author portrays the present (or at least, the very recent past) negatively in favour of the (more distant) past but it must be noted that this glorification of earlier generations would carry no force with it were it not for the apparent loss of scruple and order that followed the defeat of Carthage.

A similar but more subtle portrayal of past mores comes through the work of the Roman historian Livy (59 BCE-17 CE) (Reading 3.10). His use of exempla in his historical account of early Rome would have shown contemporary Romans “correct or righteous behaviour” (Block 3, p.46), that is to say, a virtuous path to follow. There is, for example, the episode involving Horatius Cocles who single-handedly kept Etruscan enemies in abeyance while his comrades burnt the bridge behind him, the only viable access to the inner city. Just as impressive is the feat of Caius Mucius who, after a failed attempt at stabbing the Etruscan king, burnt his right hand in defiance of his enemies who consequently granted him a pardon. The effect of these tales on later generations should not be underestimated. Witness an epigram by the poet Martial (c.38-c.101 CE) who recounts how he saw a representation of this event “in Caesar’s arena” and considered the act to be “glorious” (Block 3, p.49). Although extreme, the telling of these early feats of human will was no doubt designed “to help and inspire contemporary readers in their public life” (OCCC p.346), confirming the view that considerations about the present weighed heavily in the representation of the past.

It was such considerations that fuelled the celebrations of ancestors and family on the occasion of a funeral of one of the elite. Polybius (c.200-c.118 BCE) tells us that these were of a largely public character, featuring a speech on the deceased’s achievements and successes by his son or relative (Reading 3.12). The laudatio funebris would then embrace the exploits of other dead ancestors and “these orations were preserved for future exploitation” (Lintott, 1986). In some cases these achievements would be inscribed on the tomb of the deceased, as in the case of the Scipios. These inscriptions would list political offices held, military successes, public monuments in the deceased’s name and, more often than not, contain the names of the male forebears who had also achieved distinction. It was also fashionable in those times to boast divine or heroic ancestry to enhance the prestige of the family in the eyes of contemporaries (Block 3, p.71-2). Thus in the funerary oration for his aunt, Gaius Iulius Caesar claimed that she sprang from kings on her mother’s side and from Venus on her father’s side, his grandfather (Reading 3.13). This remarkable lineage of course reflected on Caesar himself who was proud in this instance to use the past to boost his status at the time he made the speech in 69 BCE.

The tie between past and present could be acute in the writing of history, especially when the author “told of events in which he had played a part” (OCCC, p.346), as in the case of Caesar’s Commentaries on his Gallic and Civil Wars. Through the use of third person narrative, Caesar purported to create a temporal distance between the actual events and his writing of them. Arguably, this device enhanced the historical dimension of the works. However, it has been argued (ECW, Essay six) that the commentaries were in fact disseminated during the campaigns, forming as it were a kind of correspondence from the front. If such was the case, here was an instance where the past, in the form of Caesar’s accounts, was actually determined by the present, namely the securing of a position back home as a leading Roman figure. Caesar being “a man of the people” (ECW, Essay six), the oral dissemination of these works would have hugely increased his popularity and constituted a deft political move.

An equally self-serving account of the recent past was the Res Gestae of the princeps Augustus. This account of his own life sought to create a link between Rome’s golden age and his personal rule. Thus, he claimed that he “transferred the republic back from my power into the authority of the senate and people of Rome” and that “after this time [27 BCE] I surpassed all in status yet I held no more power than those who were my colleagues in office” (Block 3, pp.134-5). However we choose to view this high-handed statement, the fact is it sought to strengthen Augustus’ legitimacy as a ruler by creating the impression that he was in fact restoring Rome to her former greatness. He also justified his legislative programme in similar terms: “I recalled many ancestral habits that were disappearing from our own way of life and I myself handed down many exemplary habits to be imitated by posterity” (Block 3, p.139). Again, only the past seemed to offer legitimacy to present political decisions and this philosophy can be detected in the work of the poet Horace (65-8 BCE).

Horace’s Ode 3.6 (Reading 3.25) decries the loss of piety in Rome which, in his view, was a major cause in Roman military defeats and the turmoil of the Civil War. He urges his readers to “atone for the crimes of [their] fathers” by restoring the temples and shrines of the gods, a policy which Augustus successfully pursued. He then deplores the pollution of “marriage, children and households” (Block 3, p.151) through a decline in morality and the pervasiveness of “sin.” Again, these ‘problems’ were addressed by Augustus in his legislation on marriage and adultery. For our purposes, however, most interesting are the final stanzas of the poem where his “graphic image of contemporary depravity [leads] into a contrasting picture of past virtue” (Block 3, p.151), be it in terms of military success, righteous behaviour or rural habits. His last verse concludes on a pessimistic note of inevitable degeneration through time. Like Sallust, Horace relates to the Roman past as an idyll which, although corrupted through time and religious neglect, should continue to inspire contemporary Romans to act the right way. It also paved the way for the reforms of Augustus who posed as the saviour of the Republic.

1,533 words

Bibliography
Ancient sources
Sallust, The Conspiracy of Catiline 1.10-13 in Handford, S.A. (trans.) (1963), The Jugurthine War/The Conspiracy of Catiline, London: Penguin, pp.181-83
Livy, 2.10-13 in de Selincout, A. (trans.) (1967), The Early History of Rome, Books I-IV The History of Rome from its foundation, London: Penguin, pp.98-104)
Martial, Epigrams 8.30
Polybius, 6.53 in Scott-Kilvert, I. (trans.) (1979) Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, London: Penguin, pp.346-47)
Horace, Delicta maiorum, in Shepherd, W.G. (trans.) (1983) Horace: The Complete Odes and Epodes, London: Penguin pp.138-40; Bennett, C.E. (trans.) (1978) Horace: the Odes and Epodes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and London, Heinemann

Modern Scholarship
Cowell, F.R. (1956) Cicero and the Roman Republic, London and Chochester: Pelican Books
Andrews, C., Fear, T. and Perkins, P. (2006) A219 Block 3: The Roman Republic, Milton Keynes: The Open University
Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds) (1998) The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Lintott, A. (1986) ‘Roman Historians’ in Boardman, J., Griffin, J. and Murray, O. (eds), The Oxford History of the Roman World, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press
Wiseman, T.P. (1974) ‘Legendary Genealogies in Late Republican Rome’ in Greece and Rome, 2nd series, vol.21, no.2, pp.153-64)
James, P. (2006) ‘Roman reputations: famous figures and false impressions in the late republic’ in Perkins, P. (ed.), Experiencing the Classical World, Milton Keynes: The Open University

Lysistrata

2009-05-26T11:04:00.000-07:00

Read Aristophanes, Lysistrata, lines 167-83, ‘CALONICE: Well, if that’s what you both think ... LAMPITO: ... we are ready to swear.’ Consider the above passage in no more than 500 words:
(i) Briefly provide its context;
(ii) Consider how far this passage, while at first sight appearing to be written for comic effect, nevertheless has serious issues underlying it.

This passage is taken from the prologue of Lysistrata by Aristophanes. It occurs before the parodos, the entrance of the chorus on stage. Lysistrata has outlined her plan to the Greek women gathered around her¬ – ¬“we must abstain from – cock and balls” (124). It is an important exchange between Lysistrata, the Athenian, and Lampito, the Spartan. The passage ends with the all-important pledging of the oath to enforce the plan. The two leading women also encourage each other, in a kind of friendly rivalry, to demonstrate their power over their respective menfolk. Further, challenged by Lampito, Lysistrata pledges herself to a practical political act – the seizure of the Acropolis, i.e. physically to block access to the temple that houses the state treasury.

The comic effect of the passage stems from the absurdity of the exchange. That women should be able, through sexual abstinence, to provoke peace is clearly a fantasy. The humour thus stems from the apparent seriousness of what is said, including the pledging of an oath, with the very shaky premise of the play. As is clear from the exchange, the immediate issue at stake is the apparently never ending conflict with Sparta. The war has exhausted both human and material resources on both sides. Furthermore, the structure of Athenian democracy itself has become increasingly under threat, following the disastrous Sicilian expedition (BHAG, p.213-17). The return of the tyranny of Hippias is often trailed as a threat (Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 619). The second and more central issue, from the point of view of the comedy, is the unprecedented political role played by the women of Athens and Sparta. The comedy may seem to the males of the audience as a pure fantasy given the traditionally subservient role of women during that period (OCCC p.777, BHAG pp. 157-161). He cleverly chooses the one instance of communal power the women did have in 5th century Athens, viz their specific role in all-women religious ceremonies (such as the Greek festivals of Aphrodite and Demeter that involved sexual humour, OCCC p.779) to drive the point home and this is confirmed by the fact that “the over-age women have instructions [...] to seize the Acropolis under pretence of making a sacrifice” (176-9). Lysistrata herself reminds her audience of such gatherings in the opening lines of the play (Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 1-2). Aristophanes does this specifically to counter the otherwise preposterous premise of the play. At this point, to see the play as in any way a proto-feminist tract would be a serious misreading because the real power the women wield in it is entirely based on their sexuality such as in the scene between Cinesias and Myrrhine (Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 829-1013). A third issue lies in the deprecation of Athens in the mouth of Lampito: “how is one going to persuade that riffraff not to act barmy?” (170-1). On a superficial level, of course, this statement illustrates what the Spartans typically think of the democratic Athenians. But that Aristophanes should make such a side-comment in his play is revealing of a certain loss of Athenian self-esteem following the set-back of the war and of the Sicilian expedition. While the play as a whole portrays Sparta in a favourable light, this barely implicit jibe at Athens’ reputation is revealing of Aristophanes’ trenchant humour and satirical power.

549 words

Bibliography
Ancient sources
Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 167-83, in Sommerstein, A.H. (trans.), Oxford: Oxbow Books, pp.15-53

Modern scholarship
Budelmann, F., Hardwick, L. and Robson, J. (2006) A219: Block 2: Classical Athens, Milton Keynes: The Open University
Pomeroy, S.B., Burnstein, S.M., Donlan, W. And Roberts, J.T. (2004) A Brief History of Ancient Greece: Politics, Society and Culture, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Hornblower, S. And Spawforth, A. (eds) (1998) The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization, Oxford: Oxford University Press

The Acropolis

2009-05-26T11:03:00.000-07:00

Answer the following question in no more than 1,500 words:
‘A conscious programme of display.’ Making close reference to the art and architecture of the Acropolis, explain and illustrate what is meant by this phrase. Then take any one of the other sources you have studied in Block 2, and briefly analyse the comparisons and contrasts that may be made between this source and the Acropolis in this matter of display.

If the Acropolis in Athens is to be treated as ‘a conscious programme of display’ (Block 2, p.76) we must briefly look at the historical and political context in which it was built so as to understand the purpose and nature of the undertaking. We can then seek to interpret the remaining material evidence of the Acropolis in the light of that building programme. As we shall see, the material evidence carries with it a metaphysical dimension as well as an obvious physical one. We shall then briefly draw an analogy between the intended effect of the Acropolis and Thucydides’s rendering of Pericles’s speech dedicated to those who fought and died in the first year of the Great Peloponnesian War in 431 BCE.

By the time the Athenians, and Pericles first among them, turned their attention to re-building the site of the Acropolis in the middle of the fifth century BCE ¬-- a site which had been sacked by the Persians in 480 BCE and left largely untouched since then -- the Athenian empire was very much alive, although weakened by a revolt in Euboea and the defection of Megara to the Peloponnesian league. A connection was made in the mind of ordinary Athenian citizens between the radical democratic constitution in Athens and the possession of the empire bringing wealth and success to the polis (Joint Association of Classical Teachers, 2008, p.26). Indeed, after Xerxes’s defeat, Athens became a major cultural centre (BHAG, p.138) and some of the money received from the league against Persia led by Athens was used to celebrate religious festivals and to build magnificent buildings, such as the Parthenon in 447 BCE (ibid).

As “the guiding spirit of Athenian imperialism” (BHAG, p.145) Pericles instigated the building of this temple and others, all adorned with sculptures, on the Acropolis meaning ‘city-top’ or ‘citadel’ (JACT, 2008, p.74). According to the same source (2008, p.26) “there is little doubt that, from the first, these buildings made a statement about Athenian power and superiority. Through them, Athens presented herself as a city fit to be the leader of an empire.” Pericles justified this display of power in the following terms, according to Plutarch (Life of Pericles, 12.4): “It is fair that the city, once she has been equipped with what is necessary for war, should turn the surplus over to works which, when completed, will bring her everlasting glory.” Democratically, the public building would, appropriately, “stir every hand until almost the whole city will be under contract” (Plutarch, Life of Pericles, 12.4). In what way then does the Acropolis symbolise an imperial, yet democratic, programme?

The first point to note is that of location (Illustrations Book, Plate 3). The Acropolis is situated on a rocky hillside that rises 120 m from the surrounding plain (JACT, 2008, p.74). This made it “a natural place of refuge in time of trouble” (ibid). Secondly, on top of being “the central fortress,” the Acropolis is “the principal sanctuary of Athena, patron goddess of the city” (OCCC, p.93). One of the first monuments to be erected after the sack by the Persians was a bronze statue of Athena Promachos “set up to celebrate victory over the Persians” (ibid). This statue was visible from what was to later be the Propylaea, the gateway building to the Acropolis (Illustrations Book, Plate 10). Towards the end of the fifth century, the statue was housed in the most sacred of the temples of the Acropolis, the Erechtheion. Thus, the imperial implications of the Acropolis are evident from the outset, chronologically and geographically; at its entrance lay a statue celebrating that victory which was instrumental in the formation of the Athenian empire.

Next came the Parthenon, undoubtedly the most known and celebrated monument of the Acropolis. Temple to Athena, housing an unprecedented gold and ivory statue of the goddess, the Parthenon also served as the state treasury (Block 2, p.74) confirming its status as “a monument to Athens’ imperial position” (JACT, 2008, p.80). Indeed, the move of the treasury of the Delian league from Delos to Athens in 454 BCE (Block 2, p.74) marks the beginning of what is now called the Athenian empire. This was no ordinary treasury however. The Parthenon was “the largest temple of its day” (ibid), positioned in the centre of the Acropolis and visible from afar, to friends and foe alike (Experiencing the Classical World, p.98). Especially of interest are the temple’s sculptures, i.e. the pediments, the metopes and the endlessly controversial frieze. Together these can be viewed “as celebrating Athens’ spiritual life, military prowess and cultural pre-eminence” (ECW, p.99).

The pediments, for example, depict, on the east end, the birth of Athena, and on the west end, the contest between her and Poseidon for the possession of the land (Readings Book 1, Reading 2.6., Pausanias 1.24.5). These pediments portray the power of the polis as having divine origin (birth of Athena) on the one hand and divine sanction (reign of Athena) on the other. The metopes “depict various battles between the powers of civilisation and groups that are somehow uncivilised – the gods battle against the giants, the Greeks against the Amazons” (ECW, p.99). The message thus conveyed is unequivocal: Athens is the bastion of civilisation, Hellenism, and has to assert herself in the struggle against un-Greek barbarians on the one hand, and possibly undemocratic Greek poleis on the other, i.e. poleis not forming part of her empire, the chief among them being Sparta.

The frieze itself is said to depict the festival of the Panathenaia, dedicated to the patron goddess Athena, and certainly suggests as much in terms of the procession it depicts although its actual constitution is somewhat mythical, if not aristocratic, with a predominance of cavalry and charioteers (Robin Osbourne, 1987, pp.103-104). Nevertheless, the fact that the procession (which was all-inclusive in that all members of the polis, citizens and denizens alike, took part in it) made its way to the Parthenon frieze shows that the building programme was open to influences which were not solely those of the powerful. The frieze is a loose but undeniable representation of unity and not of struggle, like the metopes.

In his essay on Classical Athens (ECW, pp.99-100), James Robson points out the thematic unity of the Acropolis as a whole. Thus the already mentioned statue of Athena Parthenos included “a shield sculpted with scenes of the battles between both gods and giants and Greeks and Amazons [and] sandals whose decoration included the battle between Lapiths and centaurs (all motifs found on the temple’s metopes).” In addition, the Parthenos statue could be seen as complementing the already mentioned Promachos statue, while the temple of Athena Nike that sits just outside of the Acropolis boasts a frieze representing the battle of Marathon which was a major Greek victory against the first Persian invasion by Darius. Rather like the Parthenon frieze, an actual event, in this case a battle, had entered the world of myth and was thus fit to be the object of a temple’s decoration.

A similar glorification of past deeds is to be found in Pericles’ Funeral Speech dedicated to those who died in the first year of the Great Peloponnesian War in 431 BCE (Readings Book 1, Reading 2.8 Thucydides 2.34-46). In 2.36 Pericles glorifies, alongside “our ancestors,” “our own fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire which we now possess.” The not- too-distant past, symbolised by the battle of Marathon on the temple of Athena Nike, features in the opening words of the statesman’s speech. In 2.43 he notes that “heroes have the whole earth for their tomb.” The following sentence in 2.41 sums up the building programme on the Acropolis: “the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs.”

As with the Parthenon frieze, there is no reference in the speech to named individuals or fighting units, although the war dead were mainly cavalry, i.e. from the upper-classes. Athens being a democracy of sorts, Pericles was careful not to single out any individuals or groups of individuals which would undermine the unity of the state. The emphasis is on participation, and there is no doubt that the construction of the Acropolis entailed a wide participation from the citizen and non-citizen body alike, as noted above. Intriguingly, Thucydides puts the following words in Pericles’ mouth: “For Athens alone of her contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation.” This sits oddly with Thucydides’ own statement (Thucydides 1.10) that were Athens to be found in ruins, “one would conjecture from what met the eye that the city had been twice as powerful as in fact it is.” This, if anything, points to the success of the Acropolis in conveying the power of Athens and her empire, making her, to quote Pericles, “the school of Hellas.” Pericles’s observation in 2.45 that the most ‘glorious’ women keep themselves discreet is mirrored in the aforementioned frieze in which a tiny minority of women figure.

1,510 words

Bibliography
Ancient sources
Plutarch, Life of Pericles
Pausanias, Guide to Greece, vol.1, in Levi, P. (trans.) (1979 [1971]), Hammondsworth: Penguin, pp.69-70)
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.34-46, in Crawley, R. (trans.) (1997), Ware: Wordsworth Editions, pp.93-100
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.10, in Crawley, R. (trans.) (1997), Ware: Wordsworth Editions

Modern scholarship
Budelmann, F., Hardwick, L. and Robson, J. (2006) A219: Block 2: Classical Athens, Milton Keynes: The Open University
Joint Association of Classical Teachers (2008) The World of Athens, Cambridge and NY: Cambridge University Press
Pomeroy, S.B., Burnstein, S.M., Donlan, W. And Roberts, J.T. (2004) A Brief History of Ancient Greece: Politics, Society and Culture, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Robson, J. (2006) ‘Self and Society in Classical Athens’ in Perkins, P. (ed.), Experiencing the Classical World, Milton Keynes: The Open University
A219 Illustrations Book

The Gods in Homer

2009-03-22T05:58:00.000-07:00

(a) Choosing the books you have read in either the Odyssey or the Iliad, consider the role of the gods. Do you think they enhance or detract from the effect of the poem?

Let us consider the role of the gods through the medium of Lattimore’s translation of the Iliad, focusing on Books 1, 22, 23 and 24, bearing in mind that as a modern translation, the text cannot convey the religiosity that the oral performances must have had for the Greek listeners of 8th century BCE (CD1, Track 20). As will soon be apparent, the role of the gods appears to be both theological and poetic. I will consider both aspects together in what follows.

Book 1 (Readings Book 1, 1.1) opens with an appeal to the Muse to sing “the anger of Peleus’ son Achilles” (Homer, Iliad 1.1). This shows that the role of the gods is not merely confined to the narrative but is actually central to the performance of the poem itself. And it is because Homer is the Muse’s mouthpiece, so to speak, that he has knowledge of divine happenings (Naoko Yamagata, 2006, p.72).

Homer then notes that “Zeus’ will was accomplished” (Homer, Iliad 1.5) from the moment of the bitter enmity that opposed Achilles to Agamemnon. Thus, from the very beginning, the epic is presented as the necessary consequence of Zeus’s power over the mortal world.

The confrontation between the two kings is said to be the work of Apollo, who has been petitioned by a priest of his, Chryses, to inflict suffering on the Achaeans (Homer, Iliad 1.8-42). In this instance Apollo is making up for an injustice committed against one of his protégés (Homer, Iliad 1.26-34). He is indebted to the latter (Homer, Iliad 1.40-41). Apollo is moved to come to Chryses’s help because Chryses has sacrificed in his favour (Homer, Iliad 1.40-1). In coming to his help, Apollo is upholding the principle of reciprocity. Thus one role of the gods is to uphold certain values, for example repayment of debts and acknowledgement of sacrifices offered (Block 1, p.50).

Line 55 shows how the gods can manipulate mortal minds; in this case Achilles calls his people to assembly because Hera has put the idea into his mind. In line 56 it is said that Hera “had pity upon the Danaans when she saw them dying”. Similarly in Book 23 the gods are filled with compassion in the face of Hector’s body being mistreated by Achilles (Homer, Iliad 23.23). Not only are the gods moved by the plight of mortals but despite their ruthlessness they are capable of profound human emotion. The gods as spectators of the human world are also influenced by it as the experiences and emotions that animate it are not foreign to them. In this way they form an audience within the poem which ponders on the events that have occurred so far.

Divine concern and sympathy (Homer, Iliad 1.195-6) can translate into deus ex machina intervention. Athena’s intervention at the point when Achilles “weighed in mind and spirit” two courses of action allows the epic to continue; a dead Agamemnon would halt the seizure of Troy (Homer, Iliad 1.194-222). As Oliver Taplin (1986, p.50) points out, some scholars have suggested that this episode is merely a poetic personification of Achilles’s better judgement and says little about the role of the divine. He goes so far as to argue that “the gods in Homer do not have a theological existence independent of particular poetic context” (p.75). In my view the question is an open one: the gods, Zeus especially, certainly have fixed theological attributes and, as we shall see, are beyond fate. In terms of their strictly poetical role it might be noted at this point that many of the lesser divinities in the poem are nature personified; Dawn (Homer, Iliad 23.109), the winds Boreas and Zephyros (Homer, Iliad 23.195), Helios (sun).

In lines 238-9 Achilles characterizes the Achaeans as “administering the justice of Zeus.” This confirms the opening lines of the epic that portray mortals as agents of divine will (Homer, Iliad 1.5). The following pages of Book 1 highlight another important function of the gods which is to bestow honour, which in the case of Achilles means punishing the Achaeans (Homer, Iliad 353-4). The scene on Olympus at the end of Book 1 sheds light on the human-like interaction between the gods, providing relief and counterbalance to the grim affairs in Troy (see esp. Homer, Iliad 1.599-600).

Jumping to Book 22 (Readings Book 1, 1.3) Apollo meets Achilles in the heat of battle and probes him, drawing a vexed answer (Homer, Iliad 22.7-20). Apollo contrasts his nature that is “not fated” with Achilles’s, and he in turn notes that the god has “no retribution to fear.” The role of the gods is characterized by their impunity as compared to mortals or, in other words, their lack of fate.

However, they play a part in determining the fate of mortal protagonists ; for example, when Zeus weighs the scales (or mixes the urns of sorrow and blessing in Homer, Iliad 24.527-33) while Achilles chases Hector (Homer, Iliad 22.208-213) and the latter’s death is decided¬ . This weighing of the scales at this point of the narrative is surely designed to heighten the tension, although we know through Athena that Hector was “long since doomed by his destiny.” The gods appear to be partisan, favouring those with divine blood (see Hera’s reply to Apollo at 24.56-63). These instances of divine participation elevate the action. Indeed, what good would great heroic deeds be without the gods as witnesses?

The gods’ favouring of some over others is manifest in Book 23 (Readings Book, 1.4) which describes the funeral games in honour of Patroclus. This happens after the gods (Aphrodite and Apollo) have prevented Hector’s body from decomposing and being fed on. In so doing they uphold Hector’s dignity as a deceased human being (Homer, Iliad 23.184-191). During the chariot race Apollo dashes the whip from Diomede’s hands (Homer, Iliad 23.383-4) and Athena, detecting his “foul play”, returns the whip to the warrior (Homer, Iliad 23.388-90). In this instance the competition between mortals is paralleled by competition between the immortals as they aid their favourites and harm those they despise.

Book 24 (Readings Book 1, 1.5), the last of the Iliad, reveals how the epic is unimaginable without the gods; they are essential to its unfolding. Lines 33 to 76 consist of a conversation between the gods over Hector’s dead body. Apollo bemoans the gods’ supporting of Achilles “within whose breast there are no feelings of justice. . . [whose] purposes are fierce. . .[whose] spirit is haughty. . . [who is without] shame” (Homer, Iliad 24.39-45) It may be argued that the gods, as omniscient beings, have a certain claim to judging the behaviour of mortals. More interestingly, Apollo’s characterisation of Achilles as a ruthless man reveals a limitation to the gods’ influence over mortals. “They do not change human nature” (Lattimore, 54). Achilles is Achilles; the gods do not make him what he is.

Do the gods enhance or detract from the effect of the poem? It is undoubtedly an intrusion of modern sensibility to think you can dispense with the gods in the narrative. The question betrays a modern taste which is used to different literary devices and certainly not to divine intervention. But it is clear in my view that both poetically and practically the gods enhance the poem enormously, giving it an extra layer of meaning as it were, not to mention of magnificence.

1,234 words

Ancient source

Richmond Lattimore (trans.) (1961) The Iliad of Homer, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press

Modern scholarship

Emlyn-Jones, C. and Yamagata, N. (2006) A219 Block 1: Homer and the Greek ‘Dark Age’, Milton Keynes: The Open University

CD1, Track 20: Homer in Translation-introduction

Naoko Yamagata, ‘Sing Muse: Authorial voices in Ancient Greek Poetry’ in Phil Perkins (ed.) (2006), Experiencing the Classical World, Milton Keynes: The Open University, 69-85

Oliver Taplin (1986), ‘Homer’ in Boardman, Griffin, Murray (eds), Oxford History of the Classical World, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 50-77

Richmond Lattimore (trans.) (1961) The Iliad of Homer, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 54

C'est L'Economie Idiot

2009-03-20T11:02:00.000-07:00

Dans mon morceau Exces du marche, je soulignai le fait que les philosophies du marche qui transforment les etres humains en des ressources humaines atomises dominent la modernite. D'ou vient cette pulsion de faire de l'argent ? Sans doute la pauvrete est ce que la majorite des gens redoute le plus. Des histoires refroidissantes du tiers monde confirment cette peur. Et chacun est temoin de la condition des sans-abris. La raison pour laquelle le travail a gagne un sens aussi large est que quelquepart dans l'esprit humain, le travail a ete associe avec la prosperite, l'allegement et la victoire sur la pauvrete. "Making poverty history" etait une declaration de valeurs de l'occident, non sans arrogance. En tant que depressif, j'ai souffert de la facon dont le systeme est construit ; etre positif, etre pro-actif (=etre sans pensee) sont des impossibilites pour moi. Je suis force de vivre sur des aides sociales et d'appartenir a cette minorite non negligeable d'individus qui ne peuvent travailler et contribuer a la "force de travail." Il demeure que j'ai mes doutes si le travail ait fait quoiquecesoit pour ameliorer la pauvrete par opposition a l'appareil technologique. Et la technologie a son tour cree une pauvrete destructrice-l'epuisement de ressources naturelles, la deforestation, la pollution etc. Il ne fait aucun doute pourquoi les politiciens veulent le plein travail ; les gens qui travaillent sont des gens qui n'ont pas le temps de penser par eux-memes, et donc mettre en interrogation le systeme et menacer la structure de pouvoir en place. L'economie sert de justification pour l'esclavage volontaire et la soumission active. Il s'agit d'un concept totalitaire qui infiltre nos vies privees. Par contraste, en grece ancienne les matieres economiques etaient confinees a l'oikos, le menage, qui donna notre mot economie. Un autre theme a explorer est celui de l'egalite par le travail en rappelant ce que Tocqueville nomma la passion pour l'egalite dans les democraties modernes.

It's The Economy Stupid

2009-03-20T10:42:00.000-07:00

In my piece Market Excesses I highlighted the fact that market philosophies that transform human beings into atomised human resources are predominant in modernity. Where does this urge for money making come from? Undoubtedly poverty is what the majority of people fear the most. Gruelling stories about the third world confirm this fear. And we all have come accross the plight of the homeless. The reason why work has taken on such an all encompassing meaning is that somewhere in the human psyche work has been associated with prosperity, alleviating and defeating poverty. "Making poverty history" was a Western statement of values, not without its arrogance. As a depressive I have suffered from the way the system is designed: being positive, being pro-active (=being thoughtless) are all impossibilities for me. I am forced to live on benefits and belong to that significant minority of individuals who cannot work and contribute to the "work force." Still I have my doubts as to whether work has done anything to improve poverty as opposed to technological apparatus. And in turn technology fosters its own kind of destructive poverty-depletion of natural resources, deforestation, pollution etc. There is no doubt as to why politicians want full employment; people who work are people who do not have time to think for themselves, therefore to question the system and with that questionning threaten the power structure in place. The Economy serves as a justification for voluntary slavery and active submission. It is a totalitarian concept which infiltrates our private lives. Contrast this with Ancient Greece in which matters economic were confined to the oikos, the household, from which are word economy is derived. Another theme to consider is how work equalizes and fits what Tocqueville called the passion for equality in modern democracies.

Terre et technologie

2009-03-12T09:26:00.000-07:00

La tragedie du mouvement ecologique, outre son intervention trop tardive au cours du siecle dernier, est qu'il n'a pas la faveur des circonstances : ce n'est pas dans nos societes desintegres que l'on trouvera un desir collectif de changement dramatique de style de vie. Cela tient au fait que chacun n'est pas responsable dans le sens que chacun pris individuellement n'est cause du probleme ecologique. La cause se situe a l'echelle planetaire et est liee aux transformations physiques de l'environnenment qu'engendre l'activite humaine-donc l'existence humaine-aidee de la technologie.

Il est clair a mon sens que retarder le declin de l'humanite revele non pas d'une quelconque volonte collective, ni meme du miracle, mais-comble de l'ironie-de la sphere techno-logique, celle-la meme qui a accelere les difficultes environnementales de l'homme. Or la technologie assume une existence autonome, a peine controlable, des lors qu'elle est integree au monde artificiel que l'homme s'est construit au fil des millenaires. Ce n'est pas parce que ce sont les humains qui actionnent la technologie que celle-ci leur est soumise. Au contraire, par son existence meme, la technologie presuppose l'actionnement humain. En ce sens, puisque l'actionnement est non seulement a prevoir mais necessaire (la technologie faisant partie integrante du monde qu'habite l'homme), c'est plutot les hommes qui sont soumis a la technologie. Mieux, l'existence humaine (existence : manifestation ontologique-relevant de ce qui est-de l'homme) se definit dans son rapport de subordination a la technologie autant qu'autrefois elle pouvait se definir dans son rapport de subordination a la nature ; car la technologie n'ayant de sens que si elle est integree au monde des hommes, fait partie integrante de l'environnement sur lequel se construit son activite (sociale). La guerre est peut-etre l'expression la plus pure de ce double rapport de subordination, tant a la nature qu'a la technologie. Un esprit vif pourra me retorquer que cette derniere distinction est artificielle : l'homme etant un animal terrestre, son action est une manifestation de la nature-y compris la guerre-et ses production autant de produits 'naturels'. Cette pensee confond origine et essence conceptuelle. Si l'homme est inscrit dans l'ordre naturel des choses, il apprehende par objectivisations : conceptuellement a travers le langage et la science, pratiquement a travers le travail, qui transforme cette nature en moyen pour les fins qu'exige l'existence. La nature n'est donc plus une realite transcendente pour l'homme mais une realite objectivee (qu'est-ce le mot 'nature' si ce n'est une objectivisation conceptuelle ?), et de ce fait elle est distincte a la fois de lui et des autres objets conceptuels. La technologie est de ces derniers, distincte de la nature, distincte aussi de l'homme qui lui est sujet (pensant, travailleur etc).

Mon propos est que lorsqu'une technologie existe et est disponible, son non actionnement ne peut relever que de la decision morale, d'une volonte deliberee qui se definie contre le predonne (ce qui existe), a savoir l'environnement (qui, on l'a vu, est technologique autant que naturel). Il suit que l'homme ou la femme qui se reclame de "l'environnement" contre la technologie et de ses effets nefastes sur cet "environnement" est dans une situation ambigue : il se reclame non tant de l'environnement en tant que tel, mais de l'environnement pre-technologique et, plus fondamentalement, de l'environnement non objective, transcendant (qui est donc a traiter comme une fin et non pas simplement comme un moyen). L'ambiguite reside en ce qu'il ou elle ne peut s'empecher d'apprehender l'environnement en tant qu'objet (il ne peut en etre autrement - le langage, la pensee et l'activite sont des formes d'objectivisation) - et apres tout il est le premier a invoquer "l'environnement" - mais se refuse a en tirer les consequences pratiques, a savoir la transformation de l'objet en moyen pour des fins humaines. A ce titre ce n'est pas un hasard que les dix commandements interdisent aux hebreux la representation et l'invocation vaine de Dieu ; car s'il en fut autrement, Dieu serait reduit au statut d'objet, puis de moyen - par l'image d'une part, par le langage d'autre part. Pour etre convainquants, les 'environnementalistes' doivent insister sur le caractere transcendant de l'environnement pre-technologique, sur le fait que le travail de l'homme sur cet environnement doit etre reduit au strict minimum, la necessite de survivre, afin de limiter le glissage conceptuel de l'objet vers le moyen.

Good Things That Come With Depression

2009-03-09T19:40:00.000-07:00

Depression is a serious illness with serious consequences such as economic loss, social withdrawal, academic impairment and so on. However, serious depression comes with a certain wisdom about the human condition and human beings' limitless capacity for suffering. It is a form of transcendence. When one is depressed one experiences the Whole of existence, what the Greeks called phusis. One sees through the thinly veiled abyss of the media and of contemporary 'public' life. In my case, I could never have written my philosophical pieces without depression: Perception and Knowledge, Time and Moment, Lathoron, On Truth and so on. Arguably, with depression comes a certain increased awareness of history, if history is understood as spiritual progression, because one experiences one's body as historical. With depression also comes an increased sensitivity to the uniqueness of things, especially of beautiful things. One does not take things for granted in other words. Of course what I write is true of my depression and probably not that of others. But melancholia is a definite source of philosophy and often finds expression in the works of great poets, thinkers and composers. It is an ancient emotion, an occurrence in the human psyche that will never go away completely. There will always be depressed people and, with them, a dark perception of the world but not necessarily a bad one. Depressed people owe it to themselves to survive because theirs is a noble life, spent in communion with the Whole, even if it is delusional and self-defeating. For depression is a profound emotion, and that produndity has its place in an otherwise non profound world. Of course this is my opinion. At any rate fighting depression as I do has made me wise beyond my years in that I can detect those thoughts which bring over a precipice, those tendencies which are life-denying and dangerous, those habits which are self-destructive. It is, in short, an exercise in self-knowledge though indubitably a very unpleasant one.

Bullies, The Bullied and Depression

2009-03-05T07:35:00.000-08:00

For those of us who underwent bullying in the schoolyard and during P.E. classes the shape of today's gregarious society leaves much to be desired. I was a relatively happy child but things started to go down hill from secondary school. I was subject to verbal abuse, theft, threatened physical abuse, teasing in P.E. and so on. I became very isolated, inward-looking, quiet, superstitious (a lucky day would be a day which was bullying-free). I have retained the fear of the schoolyard in my adult years only this time the enema is the market place, that which decides which of us are successes and failures, which of us poor and prosperous, which of us respectable or indifferent. Everything that society requires be it finding a job, networking, being happy looking whilst during unpleasant work, and simply being out there and out and about in an unthinking way subconsciously reminds me of bullying tactics. Predictably I have always seen academia, perhaps misguidedly, as THE escape route from Bullying Business. But I made the unwise choice of a bullying subject and a career full of adult ex-bullies: the law. Again, as a law student, I was the odd one out, not even that good academically (which came as a shock) and alienated by all the falseness, the hypocritical and barely concealed competition (students would hide library books to founder prospects for poorer students), the extorsion of money by older students reselling their old textbooks and I remember a conversation between two young corporate workers on the bus in which Richard Wheelan was killed by Anthony Joseph (Holloway Road) which revolved around girls, French, property and football. Not to mention the hideousness of career events which required nothing less than the selling of one's soul. As a sensitive, doubtful, thoughtful and introspective soul, the world of society, be it restaurants, pubs, law firms, universities had taken the place of school scum. When I dropped out of law I did some waiting in a restaurant and was predictably bullied there also. I became a warrior, a terrorist, I became filled with a contempt of the masses, of people in general, of the way things worked. I then did some job hunting in London which meant mingling with the mob for a couple of weeks, especially in The Anchor, a restaurant in Somerset House, where the acting manager, under instructions from the owner, installed terror in staff whilst urging us to be "relaxed." I then got bullied by a co-worker during my silver-serving days, himself a law student, who would deliberatly miss my stop on the way to work, and of course the team would blame me and not him, the popular one. Then it was the Post Office which was not as bad bullying wise, the team consisting of middle-aged women, but they eventually seized the opportunity to chastise my difference and, with the help of the social services, I was to have my first trip into Mental Hospital. That's the irony of it all. Although one is clearly a victim, the psychiatric services treat one as a perpetrator, a danger to others, a "scizophrenic." The State, through benefits, has allieviated the plight of the bullying, the bully's fist has been tied down, but only for a time. I will soon have to reckon with the horror of the work place. I actually went so far as to working in a pub; the bullying came mainly from the customers but my colleagues for the most part were good. I still loathed the thought of having to smile whilst feeling like shit, and serving the Friday night mob to drink. What next? Well, I will have to be very selective in my future choices and academically it would be wise of me to favour the humanities over and above business orientated subjects like law. Which is why I am studying the Classics and Homer. To finish I will reiterate a point made by Nietzsche: there are two prevailing relationships to power. The first, which I adhere to, consists in self-development, self-mastery, virtue in the Latin sense, and often translates in creative or academic achievement. The other, which bullies adhere to, consists in putting other people down, for example in gruelling interviews, or through psychiatric labels. For example my NHS consultant blamed me for (as he put it) "living in my head" or being over-analytical and unemotional. Similarly a staff worker in my supported accommodation noted that I was "introspective" as though introspection is an undesirable thing, a disease, which society should nevertheless learn to accommodate. Plus there is the harassment from the social services to be active, to work and unsurprinsingly they are against my seeing a psychotherapist, the only hald-decent human being amongst a sea of failures. I have attempted suicide once already and no doubt my history of being bullied and negative social interaction had something to do with it. I have very supportive parents, but it still feels like I'm at school again, reporting the evils of the playground. Although I am heavily medicated, I am prone to tremendous anger; yes, life makes me very angry.

What It Feels Like To Be Depressed

2009-02-19T14:53:00.000-08:00

In my case, a painful heart, a suffocating agony of feeling, a sense of folornness and isolation, a feeling of incapacity and inadequacy, a suicidal urge, a sense perception that sees everything in a dark, translucid light, a contempt of the self and of the world, a feeling of powerlessness and despondency, a feeling that one cannot enter, have access to the world, to social positions, regret, guilt, a profound alienation from institutions and modern technology and modern human beings, in particular human beings who appear to be happy, a feeling of rejection by others, the impossibility of carrying out mundane tasks, self hate, fatigue, a feeling that everything is false, evil or malicious . How can people expect someone with such emotional woe to stay alive?

La Dépression comme protestation

2009-02-08T06:55:00.000-08:00

Dans son livre sur la dépression «The New Black» Darian Leader remarque que la dépression ne peut être réduite à des explications biochimiques mais trouve ses racines dans les formes mêmes de la société contemporaine qui transforme les êtres humains en des ressources économiques atomisées modelées par les philosophies du marché. La dépression puisqu'elle est handicapante et se met en opposition aux comportements économiques rationnels est une forme profonde et peut-être même inconsciente de protestation. Cela est vrai de ma dépression. Un exemple servira d'illustration. En racontant à un professeur de droit ma passion pour les études classiques et la philosophie il nota que lui aussi partageait ma passion mais que si je voulais survivre et gagner ma vie je devai sacrifier ma passion même si cela signifiait couper un bras. Il me fournit également une interprétation de la cigale et la fourmi par Lafontaine. La cigale profitait de la vie mais finie ruinée tandis que la fourmi qui travaillait avait de quoi survivre l'hiver. Ce dont il était inconscient est que j'avai déjà perdu non pas un mais deux bras étudiant le droit pour trois ans, dont deux ans dans l'université de Londres très orienté affaires. Je participai à des présentations de firmes de droit, acquit de l'expérience professionnelle, «constuit mon CV» et pourtant me senti aliéné et déprimé par toutes ces choses. Je ne rentrai tout simplement pas dans les représentations stéréotypés du bon travailleur des affaires. Je suis bien trop indépendant d'esprit, centré sur moi-même, philosophique, inadéquat. J'essayai tellement de conformer, de «remporter des victoires» mais je ne réussi pas universitairement (venant au pire des cas semi-préparé ou non préparé pour les examens) ou socialement. J'ai par conséquent développé une haine du marché, du salariat et de la productivité, même de la prospérité et de la performance technologiques. Tout cela me semble inhumain et sans pensée. J'ai tenté de me suicider une fois déjà en protestation contre ce qui était attendu de moi pour etre jugé normal (et non pas «scizophrénique»). Ce que j'aimerai demander a mon psychothérapeute est comment je peux gérer ma dépression et le marché en même temps : est-t-il possible pour moi de perdre mon dédain de la productivité économique et de survivre du tout même si c'est sur le plan académique ? Quels élément de ma personalité rendent cela tellement difficile de conformer même si j'en est despérément envie? Comment puis-je changer? Toutes ces questions nécessitent réponse sinon je succomberai au désespoir.

Depression as Protest

2009-02-08T06:36:00.000-08:00

In his book "The New Black" Darian Leader makes the point that depression cannot be solely reduced to biochemical explanations but has its root in the very forms of contemporary society which has transformed human beings into atomised economic resources modelled by market place driven philosophies. Depression because it is disabling and flies in the face of all acceptably rational economic behaviour is a form of deep-seated and perhaps even unconscious protest. This is true of my depression. An example will serve to illustrate the point. On telling a law professor about my passion for classics and philosophy he noted that he shared my passion but that if I wanted to survive and earn a living I would have to sacrifice my passion even if that meant cutting an arm off. What he did not know is that I had already lost not one but two arms studying law for three years, including two years in the very corporate minded London University and being a subscriber to The Economist newspaper. I attended law firm presentations, gained some work experience, "CV builded" and yet felt deeply alienated and depressed about the whole thing. I simply did not fit into the stereotypical representations of a good corporate worker. I'm far too independent minded, self-centered, philosophical, inadequate. I tried so hard to fit in, to "achieve" but I simply did not make the grade academically (which towards the end meant going to the exams half prepared or even unprepared) nor socially. I have accordingly developed a hatred of the market place, of employment and productivity, even of technological prosperity and performance. It all seems inhuman and thoughtless to me. I have attempted suicide once already as a kind of protest to what was expected of me to be deemed normal (and not "scizophrenic"). What I would like to ask my psychotherapist is how I can accommodate my depression and the market place at the same time—is it possible for me to lose my disdain for economic productivity and survive at all albeit on an academic level? What elements of my personality make it so hard for me to fit in even though I desperatly want to? How can I change? All these questions need to be answered or else I will eventually succomb to despair.

Ideology as Axiom

2009-01-29T06:14:00.000-08:00

Peter M. Higgins, "Mathematics for the Curious", states at page 56, "Where a line cuts two parallel lines, the corresponding angles are equal. This is an axiom, one of our fundamental starting rules for which we give no proof in terms of other assumptions. (Any system of mathematics begins with some assertions that are not proved. Pure mathematics is the study of their consequences)."

It is possible, though perhaps a little simplistic, to draw an analogy between the mathematical axiom, which is beyond proof, and constitutes a common assumption on which any system of mathematics is founded, and modern political ideology which seeks to enshrine itself as an axiom, a starting point, on which the social system ought to be based, determining both worth and content of human endeavours. It is inherent in ideology to ignore individuality, difference, to consider human lives as pure Bios, and not as Forms of life, that are all distinct from one another (Agamben).

As Mrs Arendt noted, ideo-logy is merely the logic of an idea, and as logic, denies the indeterminacy of language. The totalitarian states — Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia — were laboratories for the application of such systems, based as they were on a set of ideological principles to be put into practice through violent means. Before the modern era, the axioms of living-together were provided by the trilogy of tradition, religion and authority which were the bases on which humans — in the plural — lived their lives, and the grounds on which each successive generation was integrated to the world.

I will take the end of tradition as a starting point. Two of the symptons of the end of tradition, of the slow degradation and ultimate decay of the axioms of living-together are the all pervasiveness of doubt in the intellectual sphere (think of Descartes' "de omnibus dubitandum est") and its correlative, the rise of fanaticism. Indeed one presupposes the other. It is only in a context of overarching doubt that those who hold themselves out as possessing the truth can be labelled fanatical and, conversely, the fanatic is someone who has consciously eradicated his doubt in favour of a world-conception that supposedly has a monopoly over truth and righteousness. So when I said that religion had ended, I did not mean religious experience as such, but rather the kind of religious experience that is free from doubt, that does not need to confront doubt in order to affirm its faith in God. Today, at least in Western society, the believer is merely someone who has integrated doubt into the religious equation so that, paradoxically, the presence or absence of doubt has become the test measure of his faith in God, that is to say, the lesser the doubt, the greater the faith and vice-versa. I regard the philosophical stance according to which authentic faith is one that accommodates doubt as rather unsustainable on a scale beyond the individual.

So much for the fanaticism embedded in post-modern culture. Two further mathematical concepts shed light on the logic of the idea that is ideology.

A constructible number, as its name suggests, is a number which can be arrived at geometrically, that is to say, physically. "To say that a number A is constructible means that, given any line segment to act as a standard of unit length, there is a sequence of operations that can be performed using a straight edge. . . and compasses which leads to another line segment of length A." The key idea is that constructible numbers may proceed from any "standard of unit length", but have to proceed from such a standard. A similar function is performed by the ground principles of a political ideology. Firstly, their selection is as arbitrary (i.e. does not obey any law of logic) as the choice of the length of the original segment. It is enough that the principles are susceptible of acting as "measures" from which other principles can be deduced or 'constructed'. Secondly, it is these ground principles that insure the internal coherence of an ideological system so that by deconstructng the deductions or secondary principles we should always arrive at the ground principles beyond which logical scrutiny is futile. More fundamentally, however, is the realization that ideology is a construct, that everything that derives from it is constructed and that someone who professes to have the ideological upper hand is merely saying that his 'ground principles' are superior to that of his adversary, a statement which comes to us as both unsurprising and empty given the fact that, as we saw, ground principles are the result of choice, not construction. It just so happens that that somebody chose ground principles — perhaps without realizing it — which are different from those of his ideological opponent; provided that both ideologies are internally coherent neither can claim to have the logical upper hand. If he wants to be convincing he has to resort to external determinations such as, for example, the 'practical' application of his system, its 'popularity', its 'moral' superiority and so on. By doing this, however, our ideological zealot is betraying the fact that there is a reality outside of his system and that that reality is superior to his own system in at least two respects; it is the source of his system (any ideological system presupposes the basic concept of 'reality', if only because it owes its existence to that 'reality') and, as we have seen, its judge — we can be even more bold and say that history is the ultimate judge of ideology. So far so good, but the obvious danger is that by wanting to align his ideology too closely on that outside reality 'Zealot' is going to have to transform that reality in some way. Therein lies the manipulative and potentially violent nature intrinsic to any ideological position. But there is a deeper conflict; reality can never be wholly reduced to artificial constructions as surely as numbers are not all constructible (in passing, the idea that "everything is possible", that everything can be somehow constructed if there is the will, is the basic feature of the totalitarian state as defined by the creator of the concept, Mrs Arendt).

A further mathematical curiosity is the transcendental number. In constrast to constructible numbers which are algebraic, transcendental numbers are not algebraic, and are impossible to construct. π is such a number (which, incidentally, is the reason why it is impossible to square the circle as it is impossible to construct √π). Again, on the basis of an analogy, I would have thought that the existence of transcendental numbers reminds us of the limitations of our own 'constructed' reality, or more aptly, our 'constructed artificiality' and that the concept of a transcendental Being (God) proves to be intractable. The characteristic feature of transcendental numbers is that they are infinite (like algebraic numbers) but extremely difficult to identify and uncountable (unlike algebraic numbers), with the impressive result that "we can know that there are uncountably many transcendental numbers without necessarily knowing the identity of a single one of them." (Higgins, ibid).

My Depression

2009-01-23T18:13:00.000-08:00

My depression has been a major feature of my life for the past seven years, from the final year of sixth form passing my French Baccalaureate right to today. It has been a major feature all the more so that it took me seven years to have insight into my depression. The history of these seven years is the history of how I adopted mechanisms, justifications, behaviours and made decisions based on an underlying depressive state of being. For example, during the year of my French Baccalaureate I felt so afraid of the future that I didn't apply to prestigious French preperatory schools or the renowned Sciences Po although academically I was the second best in my class and obtained a Mention Très Bien for my Baccalaureate achieving high scores in French, German, Mathematics, Philosophy, History. Then my depression interfered with my higher education in law—although a brilliant student in France, I wrongly decided to go to London to complete my law degree because I didn't feel that I had a future in France despite my good progress and results and being admitted to a prestigious political school in Lille. The culture shock and my inadequacy with the world of legal business meant that I felt alienated and my depression was at its most severe although I was not aware that it was depression. Despite depressive episodes I managed to produce the odd star essay, especially in Public Law, the least commmercial of all the subjects. However, I had to resit my first year examinations ruining my chances of obtaining a vacation scheme offer or a training contract with a law firm. My aspirations of becoming a lawyer were thus thwarted early on. As I suffered acutely on a daily basis I turned to philosophy as offering me some salvation—it satisfied my active intellect and offered reasons why I should feel so distressed most of the time. I was particularly touched by Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin and was to become enmeshed in Heidegger's supreme philosophising. Still feeling depressed, doubtful, uprooted and unhappy I dropped out of law, turning to the world of classics, in particular the study of Ancient Greek and Latin. At this point I had abandoned hope of being able to earn a living on my own based on my intellect—so I turned to waiting in restaurants. After a difficult three months in a French restaurant I came to England where I job hunted in various dining venues without getting an offer of a job. After some silver serving in Cambridge I found a job in the Post Office in Saffron Walden where I now live. By this time I had convinced myself that I was a warrior defending a defeated ethos of courage, resolution and intelligence in the face of an indifferent and hostile world. The mental pressure I was under due to this philosophy led me to suffer a psychotic episode in the work place which lost me my job. I was sectionned under the Mental Heath Act and sent to psychiatric hospital where I received a treatment of Risperidone. But I persisted in the notion that I was founding a religion for warriors. Leaving hospital I found a job in a local pub which was difficult work given how inadequate I felt. Combining this with regrets about my higher education (failed—no degree) and a slow eroding of my warrior philosophy by ordinary day to day tasks I made an attempt on my life on the 3rd of October 2008 by stabbing myself in the heart area, a day after beginning antidepressant treatment. This attempt failed as I missed the heart puncturing only the lung. I was once again sent to psychiatric hospital where this time the dose of Risperidone was increased and I was diagnosed with scizophrenia. By this time my levels of depression were very high. I eventually came out of hospital back to my supported accommodation in Saffron Walden surviving from a combination of state benefits and inheritance money from my grandmother who had just passed away. I enrolled in a Classics course with the Open University, which enrolment cost me nothing because I was on benefits. Persisting low moods convinced me at last that I was depressed and had been for a while, only now I was transparent about it, not interpreting it in an erroneous way (e.g. by blaming the world). I do an afternoon a week in a charity bookshop (Oxfam), a weekly session of Tai Chi and will be doing some gardening. I plan to continue study in the classics.

Depression

2009-01-23T16:49:00.000-08:00

I would define depression as a mental illness characterised by persistently negative thought patterns consisting of regret, anxiety, fear, self-loathing, hopelessness, inadequacy, pre-emptive blackening of the future (pessimism), suicidal desires. It translates practically in a loss of energy (depression is exhausting and time-consuming), a loss of enjoyment, a loss of activity, a loss of confidence, a loss of self-belief, a loss of (mental) stability and makes the attainment of social goals that much more difficult not to say insurmountable. Depression has interfered with my higher education in such a way that I have had to drop aspirations of becoming a lawyer or an academic. My depression justifies my receiving benefits from the government in order to survive at all with such a disability.

Addendum-Depression is like the mental equivalent of AIDS in that it destroys one's psychological immune system or resilience so that negative thoughts easily enter the mind and take hold of one completely almost to the point of suicide.

Lathoron II

2009-01-23T13:06:00.001-08:00

ROMER Remember Spiegler how last time we met we were concerned with the question of truth, of what it meant and its relationship to science?
SPIEGLER Yes, vividly.
ROMER Do you recall the definition we arrived at, namely that truth is That which makes meaning possible and is suggested by the possible meaning of a word, which definition imposed itself when we realised that denying the possibility of a definition of truth suggested a meaning of truth that was undefinable yet existing.
SPIEGLER Yes.
ROMER Suppose for a moment that our default definition of truth is the natural development of all Western thought hitherto and possibly an improvement on the traditional conception of truth as being a correctness of representation and suppose further that our definition, far from being far-fetched, was waiting for someone to seize it, especially at a time when the prevailing thoughtlessness of business risks undermining the necessity or at least importance of a task such as ours, namely coming to terms with what we mean by science, objectivity and truth. How tenable would you regard such a definition in the contemporary world?
SPIEGLER I would say that our position in today's world would be difficult to maintain not to say untenable.
ROMER For what reason?
SPIEGLER The definition is difficult to apply in practice. In particular what is it that makes meaning possible? Is it not simply Being? And is Being not what the majority fear the most, is not business after all "a flight from Being?" How is one to resolutely stand within the awareness of Being without becoming isolated, misunderstood and indigent?
ROMER These are valid points you make Spiegler. I suppose that some of us mortals do not find immediate respite or salvation in the satisfaction of material and bodily desires, but are somewhat more "academic" in nature, finding repose only after having resolved or at least momentarily pushed aside the bigger picture, what you call "Being." Are you saying that these academic natures, which are reminiscent of Plato's Academy and may be justifiably regarded as his late followers, will find it difficult to carve themselves a place in today's bustling and business-orientated world? Is not university meant to be their homeground?
SPIEGLER Ideally: yes. But all the signs today point to the fact that university too is a business which leaves little room for academic natures to fulfil themselves in the way proper to them, that is, in profound reflection, contemplation and thought. I am thinking especially of all those vocational courses aimed at forming good corporate workers, be they businessmen, lawyers or journalists. Here there is little room for conscience as we defined it; the knowledge of my knowledge, little room indeed for knowledge that is not calculating and directed towards immediate consumption. Even within the more academic subjects such as classics, although the pressure is on regular essay writing and exposition of argument, little is done in the way of teaching the art of thought as such, what professor Heidegger set out to do his entire professional career. I suppose that the fate of our academic natures is tied in with the fate of the university and that the latter might follow a productive and business-orientated path, forgetting the intent of Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum.
ROMER If such a path were the fate of our universities what do you think would happen to the academic natures of this world?
SPIEGLER They would lose their spiritual home, forced into menial employment and soul-destroying human relations. They would have to abandon Being, since the soul is what strives for Being (Heidegger, the Essence of Truth) and Being is precisely what the world of business abhors. There is an incompatibility between the exigencies of earning a living and the exigencies of speculative thought. This incompatibility is not new, but an ancient phenomenon which alone explains why the thinkers of the West have been so few in number.
ROMER Would this incompatibility as you call it explain philosophical suicide, suicide that justifies itself philosophically?
SPIEGLER In some instances undoubtedly.
ROMER Why is suicide so frowned upon?
SPIEGLER I suppose that the message it sends to the world is not appreciated or even heard. It is an escape from the pressures of contemporary life and fails to condone the system as it is but rather rejects it in some way. Suicide is a measure of last resort whereby the individual who commits it takes his fate into his own hands entirely, something which the system dislikes, for such a move shows what it deems to be selfishness and an unwillingness to contribute to common prosperity and welfare.
ROMER This is no doubt true of philosophical suicide but as you rightly point out, only very few ears are apt to hear its message. The prevailing conception of suicide is that it is the result of mental insanity, instability, despair... Which is not far from the truth either since mental strain in the struggle for Being can be the result or the cause of some form of madness. In this regard, I have recently been diagnosed with scizophrenia.

Lathoron II

2009-01-23T12:32:00.000-08:00

ROMER Souviens-toi Spiegler de comment la dernière fois que nous nous sommes rencontrés nous étions concernés avec la question de la vérité, de ce qu'elle signifiait et de sa relation avec la science ?
SPIEGLER Oui, vividement.
ROMER Te rappelles-tu de la définition à laquelle nous sommes arrivés, à savoir que la vérité est Cela qui rend possible le sens et que suggère le sens possible d'un mot, laquelle définition s'imposa à nous lorsque nous avions réalisé que dénier la possibilité d'une définition de vérité suggérait un sens de vérité qui était indéfinissable mais qui existait.
SPIEGLER Oui.
ROMER Suppose pour un moment que notre définition par défaut de la vérité est le développement naturel de toute la pensée occidentale jusqu'ici et peut-être une amélioration de la conception traditionnelle de la vérité comme étant une correctude de représentation et suppose encore que notre définition, loin d'être tirée par les cheveux, attendait que quelqu'un la saisisse, surtout à une épôque où l'absence de pensée des affaires risque de mettre en doute la nécessité ou du moins l'importance d'une tâche telle que la notre, à savoir venir à terme de ce que l'on entend par science, objectivité et vérité. Combien tenable considère-tu une telle défintion dans le monde contemporain ?
SPIEGLER Je dirai que notre position dans le monde d'aujourd'hui serait difficile à maintenir pour ne pas dire intenable.
ROMER Pour quelle raison ?
SPIEGLER La définition est difficile à appliquer en pratique. En particulier qu'est-ce que c'est qui rend possible le sens ? N'est-ce pas simplement l'être ? Et l'être n'est-t-il pas ce que la majorité craint le plus, les affaires ne sont-t-elles pas après tout «une fuite de l'être» ? Comment peut-on résolument se tenir dans une conscience de l'être sans devenir isolé, mal compris et indigent ?
ROMER Ce sont des points valides que tu fais là Spiegler. Je suppose que certains d'entre nous mortels ne trouvent pas le répis ou le salut immédiat dans la satisfaction des désirs matériels et corporels, mais sont plus «académiques» par nature, ne trouvant repos qu'après avoir résolu ou du moins momentanément mis de côté le plus grand tableau, ce que tu appelles «l'être». Es-tu en train de dire que ces natures académiques, qui rappellent l'Académie de Platon et qui peuvent être considérés comme ses tards disciples, trouveront cela difficile de se faire une place dans le monde agité et affairé d'aujourd'hui ? L'université n'est-t-elle pas leur patrie ?
SPIEGLER Idéalement : oui. Mais les signes aujourd'hui indiquent le fait que l'université aussi est une entreprise qui laisse peu de place aux natures académiques de s'accomplir de la manière qui leur est propre, à savoir, dans la réflection, la contemplation et la pensée profondes. Je pense spécialement à ces cours vocationnels destinés à former de bons travailleurs, que ce soit des hommes d'affaires, des avocats ou des journalistes. Ici il y a peu de place pour la conscience telle que nous l'avons définie, la connaissance de ma connaissance, peu de place en effet pour un savoir qui n'est pas calculateur et destiné à être immédiatement consommé. Même parmi les matières plus académiques, telles les lettres classiques, bien que la pression soit sur l'écriture d'essais et l'exposition d'arguments, peu est fait en matière d'enseigner l'art de pensée en soi, ce que le professeur Heidegger s'efforça de faire tout sa carrière professionnelle durant. Je suppose que le destin de nos natures académiques est lié à celui de l'université et ce dernier suivra peut-être un chemin productif et orienté affaires, oubliant l'intention de l'Académie de Platon et du Lycée d'Aristote.
ROMER Si tel était le destin de nos universités, que penses-tu arriverait aux natures académiques de ce monde ?
SPIEGLER Elles perdraient leur patrie spirituelle, forcées de prendre des emplois minables et d'adopter des relations humaines destructrices de l'âme. Elles devraient abandonner l'être, puisque l'âme est ce qui tend vers l'être (Heidegger L'Essence de la vérité) et l'être est précisément ce que les affaires détestent. Il y a une incompatibilité entre les exigence de gagner sa vie et les exigences de la pensée spéculative. Cette incompatibilité n'est pas nouvelle mais un phénomène ancien qui seul explique pourquoi les penseurs de l'occident ont été si peu nombreux.
ROMER Cette incompaitbilité explique-t-elle le suicide philosophique, le suicide qui se justifie philosophiquement ?
SPIEGER En certains cas sans doute.
ROMER Pourquoi le suicide est-t-il si mal apprécié ?
SPIEGLER Je suppose que le message qu'il envoie au monde n'est pas apprécié ou entendu. Il est une fuite des pressions de la vie contemporaine et échoue d'approuver le système tel qu'il est mais le rejette plutôt de quelque manière. Le suicide est une mesure de dernier ressort par laquelle l'individu qui le commet prend son destin entre ses mains entièrement ce que le sytème n'aime pas puisqu'un tel geste montre ce qu'il considère être un égoïsme ou un manque de volonté à contribuer à la prospérité et le salut communs.
ROMER Ceci est sans doute vrai pour le suicide philosophique mais comme tu l'indiques jusetment, seules de très rares oreilles sont aptes à entendre son message. La conception qui prévaut du suicide est qu'il est le résultat d'un dysfonctionnement mental, d'une instabilité, du désespoir... Ce qui n'est pas éloigné de la vérité non plus puisque l'effort mental dans la lutte pour l'être peut être le résultat ou la cause de quelque forme de folie. A ce propos, j'ai récemment été diagnostiqué avec la scizophrénie.

Market Excesses

2009-01-23T12:10:00.002-08:00

For Nietzsche the basic factum to which we come as human beings is will to power. Each and everyone of us has his own will to power and evaluates the world in terms of this will to power. For example, as a thinker, I evaluate the world in terms of great thoughts which, unascertained at the time of conception, come to predominate a century or two later whereas the business man will evaluate the world in terms of what sells. Heidegger's work in the main ascertains great thoughts in their inception, growth and decline. He placed extra weight on individual thinkers who lived historically because he himself was an individual thinker who lived historically. Another example of this mode of evaluation is Nietzsche; for him "the greatest events—they are not our noisiest but our stillest hours." On The Stillest Hour he noted that "it is the stillest words which bring the storm. Thoughts that come on doves' feet guide the world." What a far cry from evaluations derived from the market place which ascertain greatness in terms of profit, popularity and business! The power politics of today which are fuelled by market considerations measure the greatness of a country in terms of its economic growth, i.e. yearly rate of production or, more accurately, destruction. Similarly, knowledge no longer stands as knowledge but as something translateable into a degree or qualification which has currency in the market place, including which institution you attented and the final score achieved. Work has also become the ultimate component of a "good" life following the diktat of the market place. Evaluations derived from the market place also decide what books are published, films produced and art works shown. As the sole concern of the market place is to make money it is entirely just to say as I did in Truthfulness and Money that money in the most truthful of truth-values and has taken the place of the Christian God as the source of all possible meaning. Money has become truth as defined by me, i.e. That which makes meaning possible and is suggested by the possible meaning of a word. On the question of truth, Heidegger decided that which definition of truth came to prevail at a particular time gave the historical shape of that age—for a long time truth was understood as "correctness of representation" but this definition changed to that of today, i.e. "That which makes meaning possible and is suggested by the possible meaning of a word" because truth is historical, i.e. subject to time and becoming, meaning that for Heidegger and myself there are no "eternal truths" as we might find in Plato and Christian theology. The danger of course is that evaluations stemming from the market place become all embrasive and prevent other modes of evaluation from ripening (man, the evaluator—Nietzsche)—other values will be deemed invalid. Yet evaluations as they derive from the market place and as they derive from thinkers are in many ways opposed (as I discovered in the various jobs I have held). To sum up: man evaluates. Today this evaluation is fashioned throughout by the market. Yet there are other modes of evaluating as we find in Nietzsche and Heidegger. "The world revolves not around the inventors of new noises but around the inventors of new values; it revolves inaudibly." In parentheses in Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 261, "it is the intrinsic right of masters to create new values." In Of Redemption Zarathustra says "the will is a creator. All 'it was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance—until the creative will says to it 'But I willed it thus!''' Perhaps Enowning will no longer seem so strange an enterprise on reading these crucially important aphorisms.

Addendum—As I noted in a French piece Société de contrôle et anarchie selling one's self through for example one's CV no longer has a pejorative or degrading connotation showing the victory of the market even in terms of the identity of the individual.

Excès du marché

2009-01-23T12:10:00.001-08:00

Pour Nietzsche le fait de base auquel on est confronté en tant qu'êtres humains est la volonté de puissance. Chacun de nous a sa propre volonté de puissance et évalue le monde en termes de cette volonté de puissance. Par exemple, en tant que penseur, j'évalue le monde en termes de grandes pensées qui, imperceptibles au moment de leur conception, viennent à prédominer un siècle ou deux plus tard tandis que l'homme d'affaires évaluera le monde en termes de ce qui se vend. Le travail de Heidegger trace principalement les grandes pensées dans leur commencement, développement et déclin. Il mit l'accent sur les penseurs individuels qui vécurent historiquement parce que lui-même était un penseur individuel qui vécut historiquement. Un autre exemple de ce mode d'évaluation est Nietzsche ; pour lui «les plus grands évènements—ce ne sont pas les plus bruyants [ex. les jeux olympiques] mais nos heures les plus calmes». Sur L'Heure la plus calme il nota que «ce sont les mots les plus calmes qui amènent la tempête. Les pensées qui proviennent de pattes de douves guident le monde». Quelle différence avec les évaluations qui dérivent du marché qui déterminent la grandeur en termes de profit, de popularité et d'affaires ! La politique de puissance d'aujourd'hui qui est motivée par des considérations de marché mesure la grandeur d'un pays en termes de sa croissance économique, c'est à dire en termes de son niveau annuel de production ou, plus précisément, de destruction. De la même manière le savoir ne vaut plus en tant que savoir mais en tant que quelquechose qui se traduit en un diplôme ou une qualification qui a courrance dans le marché du travail, dont l'institution fréquentée et le résultat final. Le travail est aussi devenu la composante ultime d'une «bonne» vie suivant le diktat du marché. Les évaluations qui proviennent du marché déterminent aussi quels livres sont publiés, films produits et objets d'art exhibés. Puisque le seul objectif du marché est de gagner de l'argent il est entièrement juste de dire comme je l'ai fait dans Véracité et argent que l'argent est la plus vraie des valeurs-vérité et a pris la place du dieu chrétien comme la source de tout sens possible. L'argent est devenu la vérité telle que définie par moi, à savoir Cela qui rend possible le sens et que suggère le sens possible d'un mot. Sur la question de la vérité, Heidegger décida que laquelle définition de vérité prévalait à un temps particulier donnait la forme historique de cette épôque—pour un long moment la vérité fut comprise comme «correctude de représentation» mais cette définition a évolué vers celle d'aujourd'hui, à savoir «Cela qui rend possible le sens et ce qui est suggéré par le sens possible d'un mot» parce que la vérité est historiale, sujette au temps et au devenir, ce qui veut dire que pour Heidegger et moi-même il n'y a pas de «vérités éternelles» comme on les trouve chez Platon et la théologie chrétienne. Le danger bien sûr est que les évaluations qui proviennent du marché deviennent omniprésentes et empêchent d'autres modes d'évaluation à porter leurs fruits (l'homme, l'évaluateur-Nietzsche)—d'autres valeurs seront jugées invalides. Et pourtant les évaluations telles qu'elles proviennent du marché et telles qu'elles proviennent des penseurs sont en maints points opposés (comme je le decouvert à mon détriment dans les divers boulots que je tins). Pour résumer : l'homme évalue. Aujourd'hui cette évaluation est déterminée pas le marché. Pourtant il y a d'autres façons d'évaluer comme est manifeste chez Nietzsche et Heidegger. «Le monde tourne non autour des inventeurs de nouveaux bruits mais autour des inventeurs de nouvelles valeurs ; il tourne de manière inaudible.» Dans Par Delà Bien et mal en parenthèses dans l'aphorisme 261, «c'est le droit intrinsèque des maîtres de créer de nouvelles valeurs». Dans de la délivrance Zarathustra dit «la volonté est un créateur. Tout "il y a" est un fragment, une devinette, une chance terrible—jusqu'à ce que la volonté créatrice lui dit : "Mais je le voulai ainsi !"». Peut-être bien qu'éreignis ne semblera plus aussi étrange une entreprise en lisant ces aphorismes d'importance cruciale. Addendum—comme je l'ai noté dans Société de contrôle et anarchie (26/7/79/1) la vente de soi par l'intermédiaire par exemple du CV n'a plus de connotation péjorative ou dégradante, ce qui montre la victoire du marché en termes de l'identité de l'individu. 15/9/1/2

The Human Face

2009-01-23T12:09:00.001-08:00

Viewed from Being, the human face defies all conventional, that is to say thoughtless, representations which systematically neglect the face as face, the being of the face, as distinct from its expression. The mind's eye, in order to grasp the being of the human face, must focus on the nose as the prominent and indeed central point of the face. When it achieves this—after several repeated attempts in front of a mirror—the eyes, mouth and ears are seized in their triangular positionning relative to the end of the nose, are almost equidistant from it. One is left with a blank, startled perhaps even distressed expression that is reminiscent of Ancient Greek and Roman figurative art. In particular the eyes appear to be bare, unfocused as they are on any being other than the Being of the face. The flatness, vulnerability, even oddness of the human face will strike those of you who make this attempt in thought. The nose, when seen as central, looks meek as compared to the developed snouts of carnivores but a showing of the teeth will reveal the beastly quality in man. A method of memorization is to focalize on the frontal part of the face, by which I mean the forehead and nose bone, which focalization reveals a location of the eyes that is immovable, the eyes themselves being movable. The mouth, the opening for food and communication, is also movable but not its location. A study of the photographs of Heidegger (1889-49/1) in his study, in particular that which is taken from the side, reveals his difference in nature. For the eyes do not have preeminence over his other facial features. He is a monster (from the latin verb monstrare, to show, and in our verb to demonstrate). As an annex we may add that the focalization on the frontal part of the face reveals a ferocious aspect, a warlike element in man, an aspect which has been forgotten today but that shall come back. 15/2/1/2

Le Visage humain

2009-01-23T12:08:00.001-08:00

Vu depuis l'Être, le visage humain défie toutes représentations conventionnelles, c'est a dire sans pensée, représentations qui négligent systématiquement le visage en tant que visage, l'être du visage, distinct de son expression. L'oeil de l'esprit, afin de saisir l'être du visage humain, doit se focaliser sur le nez comme point dominant et central du visage. Lorsqu'il y arrive—après plusieurs tentatives devant le mirroir—les yeux, bouche et oreilles sont saisis dans leur positionnement triangulaire relatif au bout du nez, y sont presque equidistants. Reste une expression vide, surprise peut-être même désarroie qui rappelle l'art figuratif de la Grèce ancienne et de Rome. En particulier les yeux paraissent nus, sans focalisation sur quelque être autre que l'Être du visage. La platitude, vulnérabilité même étrangeté du visage humain saisisseront ceux qui font cette tentative en pensée. Le nez, lorsque vu de manière centrale, parait fébrile lorsqu'on le compare aux museaux developpés des carnivores mais une monstration des dents révèlera la qualité bestiale chez l'homme. Une méthode de mémorisation est la focalisation sur la partie frontale du visage, entendons front et l'os nasal, focalisation qui révèle un emplacement des yeux amovible, les yeux eux-memes étant movibles. La bouche, l'ouverture pour l'alimentation et la communication, est elle aussi movible mais son emplacement ne l'est guère. Une étude de photographies de Heidegger (1889-49/1) dans son atelier, en particulier celle prise de côté, révèle sa différence de nature ; car les yeux n'ont pas préeminence sur le reste de ses organes faciaux. Il est un monstre (du verbe mon(s)trer). En annexe, la focalisation sur la partie frontale du visage dévoile un aspect feroce, belliqueux chez l'homme, aspect qui est oublié aujourd'hui mais qui est en passe de revenir. 15/2/1/2

Die Wohnung

2009-01-23T12:07:00.001-08:00

«Eine Welt zwar bist du, o Rom, doch ohne die Liebe
Wäre die Welt nicht die Welt, wäre denn Rom auch nicht Rom.»
—Goethe—

I. Wohnung heißt Gewöhnung

Hannah Arendt (1906-48/1) schriebte, dass die Menschen [auf der Erde leben und] in der Welt wohnen.

Was bedeutet das?

Das bedeutet,

(1) daß wir in der Welt wohnen. Die Welt ist eine Sache von Gewohnheit. Wir sind in der Welt in der Gewöhnung.

(2) daß die Welt in uns wohnt. Die Welt ist in uns, die in der wohnen. Ohne uns ist keine Welt.

Es folgt, daß die Welt in der wir wohnen—und in uns wohnt—uns gewöhnt.

II. Eine Gedankenlose Welt

Wenn die Welt in der wir wohnen—und in uns wohnt—gedankenlos ist, gewöhnt uns diese Gedankenlosigkeit daran, gedankenlos zu sein.

In einer solchen Welt, da die Gedankenlosigkeit so gewöhnlich ist, sind die Einwohner daran gewohnt, dass Niemand denkt.

Können wir uns über Gewöhnung erheben?

Wir können nicht.

III. Gedankenvolle Gewöhnung

Unsere Gewöhnung kann aber gedankenvoll sein.

Durch gedankenvolle Gewöhnung gewöhnt uns die Gedankenlosigkeit der Welt nicht mehr auf gedankenlose Weise.

Durch gedankenvolle Gewöhnung ist die Gedankenlosigkeit der Welt uns nicht mehr gewöhnlich.

Wie unterschied sich die gedankenvolle Gewöhnung von der Gedankenlose?

IV. Die beherrschte und beherrschungsvolle Gewöhnungen

Durch gedankenlose Gewöhnung sind unsere Gewohnheiten gedankenlos. Wenn die Welt in der wir wohnen—und in uns wohnt—gedankenlos ist, werden unsere Gewohnheiten gedankenlos.

Die Welt herrscht unsere Gewohnheiten.

Durch gedankenvolle Gewöhnung sind unsere Gewohnheiten gedankenvoll. Wenn die Welt in der wir wohnen—und in uns wohnt—gedankenlos ist, werden unsere Gewohnheiten nicht gedankenlos.

Unsere Gewohnheiten herrschen die Welt.

V. Beherrschung heißt Enthaltung

Martin Heidegger (1889-49/1) beobachtete, daß Mensch Mensch und nicht Tier ist insofern, als er weltreich ist.

Es ist verlockend hinzusetzen,

(1) daß Mensch Mensch und nicht Tier ist, wenn seine Gewöhnung gedankenvoll ist, weil dann seine Gewohnheiten die Welt beherrschen und er weltreich ist. Er ist weltreich, weil seine Gewohnheiten die Welt beherrschen; darum enthalten seine Gewohnheiten die Welt aber die Welt die nicht enthalt.

(2) daß Mensch Tier und nicht Mensch ist, wenn seine Gewöhnung gedankenlos ist, weil dann seine Gewohnheiten von der Welt beherrscht sind und er weltlos ist. Er ist weltlos, weil die Welt seine Gewohnheiten beherrscht; darum enthalt die Welt seine Gewohnheiten aber die keine Welt enthalten.

Mit anderen Worten :

VI. Eine Kriegers Religion

Die Welt selbst gewöhnt an Gedankenlosigkeit. Ereignis kann nur eine Kriegers Religion sein, Römische, weil ihre Wahrheit die Beherrschung unserer Gewöhnung durch Gedanke verlangt, daher auch Herrschaft der Welt, die lädt jeden zur Gedankenlosigkeit ein. Die die sich von der Welt in dieser Weise gewöhnen lassen, sind, paradoxerweise, weltlos, Tieren, weil ihre Gewohnheiten die Welt nicht durch Herrschaft enthalten aber im gegenteil sind dort enthalt. 22/9/0/2